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ABSTRACT 
Cambodia, a least developed country (LDC) with a recent history of civil war and 
genocide, has been widely considered to be a success story when it comes to the fight 
against HIV/AIDS. Within a few years of the first HIV positive blood test in the kingdom 
in 1991, it quickly became the country with the highest prevalence in the region, with 
estimates of as many as 4% of the population being infected at one point. 
In recent years, Cambodia‟s HIV/AIDS infection rates have plummeted to below 
1%, with most of the credit being given to the implementation of micro-medical 
measures, such as a 100% condom use campaign among sex workers and clean needle 
programs. While these steps are necessary, and undoubtedly beneficial, a closer 
examination of the underlying social and economic factors that helped spur the initial 
epidemic – the social determinants of HIV/AIDS in Cambodia – suggest that the fight 
may be far from over. In fact, ongoing structural changes in the Cambodian economy 
may be placing Cambodians at a higher risk for contracting the disease. Accordingly, in 
this study, we examine the social determinants of HIV/AIDS in Cambodia, as well as 
possible implications for the future.  
Through a review of the primary underlying determinants of HIV/AIDS – we find 
that there may be greater cause for concern than available data suggests.   
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
Cambodia, a least developed country (LDC) in Southeast Asia, has experienced 
the region's worst HIV/AIDS epidemic, despite having its first infection not arrive until 
1991 – seven years after neighboring Thailand had begun fighting the disease (Bith, 
2004). Within the span of one year, 15 more cases were reported, with new cases 
spreading until estimates of the nation's infection rate ran as high as 4% in late 1999 
(Cohen, 2003). 
The onset of Cambodia‟s HIV/AIDS epidemic coincided with a period of social 
and economic transition, as the country was falling into United Nations administration 
after more than eight years of civil war and conflict with the U.S. and Vietnam. The new 
UN program brought with it a certain amount of political and military stability, but also a 
rapid influx of Western investment and armed forces (Curtis, 1993).  
This combination of foreign soldiers and money, along with the collapse of the 
communist Khmer Rouge regime, which left millions of women without husbands, 
fathers, or work, is credited with a rapid rise of prostitution in Cambodia, especially in 
the capital city of Phnom Penh (Cohen, 2003). That tens of thousands of new sex workers 
were suddenly interacting with foreign clientele away from their homes and families, in 
turn, has been blamed for the quick spread of HIV/AIDS infections (Cohen, 2003).
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Early efforts to fight the disease within Cambodia centered on tactical, ground-
level micro-medical strategies (Saphonn et al., 2004). These included 100% condom use 
campaigns for sex workers, educational programs aimed at brothel workers, and clean 
needle exchanges. While there were also committees formed and educational systems put 
into motion for the general public, the clear focus was on halting the spread of HIV/AIDS 
by stemming the flow of the disease from the highest risk groups to the rest of the 
population, and especially from sex workers to their clients (Charles, 2006). 
That the Cambodian response to HIV/AIDS should have been similar to 
Thailand's efforts is perfectly reasonable. Not only are the two countries close 
geographically, but both have a long history of socially accepted prostitution, and 
Thailand had seen its HIV/AIDS new infections peak at 143,000 in 1991, and steadily 
decrease to 14,000 in 1993, where the prevalence rate has remained steady at 1.4% 
(Cohen, 2003). 
Judging strictly by the numbers, Cambodia's efforts to fight HIV/AIDS would 
have to be considered a similar success. From its peak infection rate of around 4% in 
2002, rates quickly dropped to 2% in 2003, and have stabilized at around 1% over the last 
few years (Cohen, 2003; UNAIDS, 2010).  
Within so-called "high-risk groups" such as commercial sex workers and 
intravenous drug users, new infections have also decreased. New surveys conducted by 
NGOs and government groups indicate that micro-medical measures are succeeding; sex 
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workers are increasingly using condoms with their clients and fewer needles are being 
shared (Charles, 2006). 
Given these facts, it seems clear that the small nation has made up a lot of ground 
quickly when it comes to decreasing the spread of HIV/AIDS, and it would seem that 
Cambodia should not be at an especially high risk for another pandemic. In fact, the 
country's own governmental HIV/AIDS department forecasts even lower incidence levels 
in the coming years (see Figure 1).  
 But there are some indications that the progress made against HIV/AIDS in 
Cambodia may be a strong first step, rather than a decisive victory. To understand why, 
we must consider the nation's HIV/AIDS situation in regard to the social determinants of 
health (SDH). Rather than simply think of diseases as individual biological events, or the 
opportunities for health as being based purely on medical inputs, the SDH approach takes 
into account a multitude of factors that affect a person or population‟s health outcomes, 
from the time they are born until their death. 
While we will examine the social determinants of health in more detail in the 
following chapter, note that life expectancy, disease prevalence rates, and other major 
health indicators have been shown empirically to correlate closely to socio-economic 
status, gender, and race (Wilkinson, 1996; Diderichsen et al., 2001; Marmot et al., 2006). 
These factors, in turn, influence one another in a myriad of ways within different 
countries and societies. What is most striking, however, are the ways in which they can 
be shown to affect health on the national, population, and individual level, beyond simple 
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biological differences between races, genders, and income or social classes (Wilkinson, 
1996; Marmot, 2004).  





In a very broad sense, SDH recognizes that these factors play an important role in 
determining whether any individual will have the chance to live a healthy, productive life 
or will be limited in his or her opportunities (Marmot, 2004; Wilkinson, 2006; Marmot, 
2008).  
As such, the SDH approach doesn‟t only consider the purely medical aspects of 
health – for instance, whether a person is a smoker, or the presence of a disease in their 
bloodstream – but also the factors in their life and environment that have contributed to 
these circumstances. In other words, it is very often a matter of searching for the “causes 
of the causes” (Wilkinson, 1996). 
Often, those causes can help to explain the social and economic dynamics that 
result in the "risk behaviors" that are prevalent in medical and policy literature. By 
understanding the "how's" and "why's" of the choices and circumstances that individuals 
and nations face, SDH proponents can advocate changes in policy and focus that may be 
more effective in improving health outcomes than specific medical interventions, and at 
significantly lower costs.  
The SDH perspective can be helpful in understanding general health metrics at the 
national level, but it can also be refined to understand health risks and outcomes for 
specific societies and diseases. In particular, as we shall see in this study, variables of 
social positioning manifest themselves uniquely within Cambodia (or any country) and 
affect HIV/AIDS in a way that is specific to the disease and its transmission.  
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 The purpose of this study is to examine and evaluate Cambodia's HIV/AIDS crisis 
from a social determinants of health perspective, with particular attention paid both to the 
underlying factors that may have contributed to an initial outbreak, and the potential 
effects ongoing trends could have if they persist. At the moment, no similar analysis 
exists within available published academic works
1
, and the conclusions that follow draw 
us to an alternative view of the early success seen in micro-medical programs targeted 
toward high HIV/AIDS risk populations. In addition, they allow us to make limited 
recommendations as to further preventative measures.  
 As encouraging as the success of medical HIV/AIDS prevention measures have 
been, an examination of the underlying social determinants of health suggests that the 
risk for a resurgence of new infections may be higher than the available data would seem 
to show. The second chapter of this study will begin the exploration of that observation 
by briefly introducing the Social Determinants of Health (SDH) approach, which 
suggests that a number of societal and economic factors, rather than only medical ones, 
can often be seen at the root of any outbreak in disease.  
From that point, we will examine in Chapter Three the social determinants of 
HIV/AIDS, which represent a specific subset of factors that have been identified as 
contributing to the spread of the virus. Subsequently, we will briefly cover the history and 
current state of Cambodia, both as a society and a population currently fighting an 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Chapter Four. 
                                                 
1
 Although a study of neoliberalism and its effects on Cambodia with respect to HIV/AIDS has been 
conducted by Yasar (Yasar, 2010), it focused mainly on gender vulnerabilities.  
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In Chapter Five, we will further sharpen our lens to look at the Social 
Determinants of HIV/AIDS in Cambodia, and especially current economic and policy 
shifts that may be changing key dynamics as they relate to new infections. And finally, in 
Chapter Six, we will come to conclusions and see what recommendations can be made 
about future policy from the available data on hand.  
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Chapter II: Social Determinants of Health 
 
What causes disease? It has been known for hundreds of years that certain viruses, 
bacteria, and other organic invaders can be a source of illness, and medicine has gotten 
better at identifying them and defining the associated risks. 
An interesting question arises, however, when one begins to consider where those 
risks can be thought to reasonably begin and end.  In the medical tradition, risk factors 
for disease are usually limited to influences upon the individual. That approach, which 
focuses on individual causes and remedies for illness (and especially risk behaviors), will 
be referred to throughout this paper as “micro medical,” as it is in existing literature. 
Seeing health in individual terms is undoubtedly sound, scientifically speaking.  
But do socioeconomic factors – the conditions under which we live and work – 
contribute to health risks and opportunities as well? A growing number of studies 
centered on the Social Determinants of Health (SDH) suggest that they do. Rather than 
simply think of diseases as individual biological events, or the opportunities for health as 
being based purely on medical inputs, the SDH approach takes into account a multitude 
of factors that affect a person or population‟s health outcomes, from the time they are 
born until their death. 
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While these factors may be harder to detect and quantify than micro-medical 
indicators at the individual level, aggregated health outcomes (such as disease prevalence 
and life expectancy at birth, or LEB) can be empirically tied to social determinants such 
as income and status (both national and relative), gender equality, and race, which can be 
combined to form a person's "social positioning"
2
 (see Figure 1). These factors exert an 
influence both within and between different populations and influence biology while at 
the same time being influenced by it. Social positioning is an important health 
determinant because it relates, directly or indirectly, to power within a given society. 
Those who sit atop the social and economic structure will, on average, experience the 
most favorable health outcomes, in terms of higher LEB, lower disease incidence levels, 
and a decreased rate of mental stress and illness
3
.  
 Two caveats need to be applied, though. Income and wealth, themselves large 
components of social positioning, are closely related to health within countries but not 
between them. In other words, the wealthiest in any society have the best health 
outcomes, while the poorest have the worst, regardless of GDPpc as an aggregate 
(Wilkinson, 1996); and second, a disparity in wealth, income and status does not just 
                                                 
2
 This term is borrowed from existing literature and is often used as a proxy for the combined relative 
values of a person's income, wealth, status, gender, and race within the context of a society as a whole. In 
other words, social positioning attempts define an easy way to determine an individual's place within the 
socioeconomic hierarchy (Diderichsen et al., 2001; Marmot, 2004; Marmot et al., 2006; Wilkinson, 2006).  
 
3
 While the majority of this study, through the remaining chapters, will concentrate on HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rates as a primary health indicator, it should be noted that LEB is widely considered to be a 
standard way of measuring health outcomes across and within different societies.  
 
Additionally, note that LEB is affected primarily not by an increase in lifespan by the elderly, but through 
lower mortality rates at younger ages through disease, accidents, etc. In other words, LEB improvements 




affect the poor. Indeed, nations with large gaps in wealth and status tend to have poorer 
health outcomes for all their residents, as compared to nations with more egalitarian 
systems (Wilkinson, 1996).  
  
 
Figure 1: A Social Determinants of Health Framework 





How Social Positing Affects Health 
 It would be easy to dismiss health outcomes that are related to social position (and 
its main components of income, education, occupation, gender, and race
4
 (Diderichsen et 
al., 2001) as a case of the better-off enjoying more and better access to health care, 
perhaps through better nutrition or fewer detrimental environmental factors.  
 These assertions, however, fail to hold up on the empirical level. Empirical 
studies have shown that, in some developed nations, the wealthiest and highest-status 
individuals actually utilize lower levels of health care. Despite that, mortality among 
those occupying lower social positions is higher, regardless of specific cause. As an 
example, some of the healthiest societies in the world have high rates of smoking. On an 
individual level, of course, smoking would have to be considered a risk factor for number 
of diseases and ailments. However, on a national scale, it does not correlate as strongly to 
mortality rates as some of the social determinants of health do, such as the disparity in 
incomes between those with the highest status rankings and those with the lowest 
(Wilkinson, 1996).  
 If not through direct exposure to disease and/or nutritional inputs, then how can 
wealth and status affect health on a personal level? There is substantial evidence that 
demonstrates that poverty, stress, and lower social standing can physically degrade 
endocrine and immunological systems, which have the effect of slowly wearing away 
health over the course of a person's life (Marmot et al., 2006). Additionally, the desire to 
                                                 
4
 Although race is a major component of social positioning across most of the world's societies, Cambodia 
is largely homogenous, ethnically speaking, with 90% of residents made up of ethnic Khmer. For that 
reason, issues of race and status will receive less attention than would be necessary in other contexts. 
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improve upon a lower social standing can trigger flight or fight responses within the 
body, including a number of chemical responses that can have lasting effects on health if 
they are induced repeatedly (Marmot, 2008). 
 Moreover, income and power inequalities can indirectly affect an individual's 
health by altering their perception of themselves within a society, and subsequently, 
inducing them to take on riskier behaviors in order to achieve better social positioning 
(Raphael, 2006; Wilkinson, 2006). One of the major assertions of the SDH approach is 
that behavior is largely socially determined (Diderichsen et al., 2001; Marmot, 2004; 
Wilkinson, 2006), causing individuals to take actions that, while appearing to be "risky" 
from a medical point of view, are rational and appropriate within their socioeconomic 
contexts. Understanding how strongly environment can precede and incite behavior can 
help bridge the gap between an understanding of the major determinants on a national or 
population level and the micro-medical behaviors and risk factors that must be considered 
in relation to disease prevention. 
Specific Determinants of Health 
 In as many ways as differences in social position and inequalities affect health 
outcomes on different levels, they are somewhat abstract concepts to measure within and 
across societies, much less target through changes in policy. For that reason, much of the 
SDH literature is concentrated on the means in which they manifest themselves in more 
tangible pathways. While the relative importance of various determinants continues to be 
debated, accepted studies all agree that income and wealth disparities, gender equities, 
racial standards, the availability of health care, social cohesion, daily working conditions, 
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access to education, urbanization, and women's rights are all critical pieces of the puzzle 
when it comes to understanding why health inequities are so persistent. Another factor, 
which shall be addressed separately in this chapter, is the introduction of neoliberal social 
and economic policies. While any discussion on the determinants as unique health factors 
is meant to highlight the ways in which they affect health and behavior, it should be 
noted again that they are all interrelated, and that changes in policy to one area will 
almost always affect the others as well
5
. A few of the specific determinants deserve 
special attention as they relate closely to the study of this thesis. 
 Inequalities in wealth and income produce inequalities in health and poorer 
health outcomes for all. As mentioned, the wealthiest and highest-status members of 
society can expect to enjoy longer life expectancy at birth, fewer incidences of disease, 
and lower mortality rates for all major causes of death and every age group. Additionally, 
however, nations and societies with the greatest gaps between those who rank most 
highly in status and those who rank at the bottom (whether measured through Gini 
coefficients or other means) experience lower LEB and higher mortality rates for all 
members of the population (Wilkinson, 1996) (see Table 1). 
                                                 
5
 While the broad literature on the social determinants of health agrees that social positioning (as measured 
by income, occupational status, gender, race, and education), gender, and race factor heavily into health 
outcomes, there are minor variations in the ways in which specific determinants are named and represented. 
 
Accordingly, the following descriptions should be considered an amalgamation of three leading 
descriptions: A Conceptual Framework of the Social Determinants of Health (Solar et al., 2007) and How 
Social Justice Becomes Embodied in Differential Disease and Mortality Rates, and A Framework for 
Elucidating the Pathways from the Social Context to Health Outcomes and for Introducing Policy 
Interventions (Diderichsen et al., 2001). 
 
While each is conceptually and empirically valid, they are not substantially different enough to warrant 
separate discussion in this study.  
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 Women's rights affect health for everyone. Due to imbalances of power and 
status that result from gender inequities, the progression of women's rights within a 
society can be a helpful health indicator. Some of these disparities, such as the difference 
in caloric intake between male and female children in the developing world (Sen et al., 
2007), are so straightforward as to scarcely require explanation. Children starting with a 
nutritional deficiency are far more likely to die at younger ages and suffer from 
communicable diseases. Other connections, however, are less obvious and more reliant 
on local gender norms. For instance, in many countries gender roles dictate that females 
care for children, the elderly, and the ill within a home, which doesn't just serve to limit 
their own income and advancement, but also to directly link their own health to that of 
everyone else in the household (Diderichsen et al., 2001).  
In a more direct manner, differential treatment of males and females, both in the 
third world and beyond, can create significantly different opportunities for men and 
women. Often, these are manifested in straightforward ways, such as the prevalence of 
violence against women, their ability to choose sexual partners, the timing of sexual 
encounters, and the decision of whether to raise children or not (Sen et al., 2007). 
Additionally, in many societies there are fewer employment and earning opportunities for 
women, which leaves them more likely to find themselves in lower paying and less 
secure occupations, as well as informal working arrangements (Sen et al., 2007).   
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Table 1: Life expectancy at birth and GDP (gross domestic product) in U.S. dollars 
in 2001 adjusted for purchasing power 
 Country Life Expectancy at birth GOP per person 
Japan 81.3 25,130 
Sweden 79.9 24,180 
Canada 79.2 27,130 
Spain 79.1 20,150 
Switzerland 79.0 28,100 
Australia 79.0 25,370 
Israel 78.9 19,790 
Norway 78.7 29,620 
France 78.7 23,990 
Italy 78.6 24,670 
Netherlands 78.2 27,190 
New Zealand 78.1 19,160 
Malta 78.1 13,160 
Greece 78.1 17,440 
Cyprus 78.1 21,190 
Germany 78.0 25,350 
United Kingdom 77.9 24,160 
Costa Rica 77.9 9,460 
Singapore 77.8 22,680 
United States 76.9 34,320 
Ireland 76.7 32,410 
Cuba 76.5 5,259 
Portugal 75.9 18,150 
(Wilkinson, 1996)
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 Access to health care is a straightforward, but critically important, 
determinant of health outcomes. The availability of doctors, medicines, and health 
education can affect LEB and other health indicators through the treatment of diseases 
and spread of health information. As with income and poverty, the availability of health 
services can apply differently at the national, regional, and individual level. Just because 
access to health care is prevalent within a population does not mean that every person 
will have the means to access or afford it, resulting in very different outcomes for 
individuals living in different areas or in separate social, racial, and gender classes 
(Diderichsen et al., 2001).  
 Inequalities in health care availability can result in greater gaps in social position, 
even in developed countries. Poor health, or untreated conditions, can limit prospects for 
advancement and income, as well as leaving a heavy financial burden on individuals and 
caretakers. As an example, a person files for bankruptcy due to a serious health problem 
once every thirty seconds in the United States (Healtchare, 2008). The consequences can 
be even more severe in LDCs, where relatively expensive medical treatment and the loss 
of a primary earner's income can result in “poverty traps,” which lead to further inequities 
and behavior that increases health risks (Van Doorslaer et al., 2006).  
 Social cohesion is a strong determinant of health and specifically "high-risk 
behaviors." Usually measured in criteria like voter participation, attendance of religious 
ceremonies, and other indicators of average levels of homogeneity and community 
participation across a population, social cohesion compares the "sameness" of one society 
or population to the next. Certainly, it may be the case that low social cohesion is often 
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related to large gaps in income and social positioning, but a more encompassing view, 
however, can help clarify behaviors that persist inside and outside of societal norms. For 
instance, although all major causes of death are correlated to differences in income 
distribution, lower levels of social cohesion are most strongly related to mortality rates 
stemming from alcohol, homicide, and accidents at the population level (Wilkinson, 
1996).  
 While it may seem logical to assume that individuals with stronger social 
networks are more likely to stay within the bounds of accepted behaviors, and thereby 
engage in fewer "high risk" activities, it appears that social cohesion molds policy and 
behavior at the national level as well. The more tightly-knit a society, the less likely they 
are to enact laws and standards that lead to poor health outcomes for everyone. Wilkinson 
characterizes this as a situation where "individuality in the values of the market are 
restrained by a social morality" (Wilkinson, 1996). This idea will be important when we 
return to an examination of the effects that neoliberal policies have on the social 
determinants of health. 
 Employment conditions play a major factor in health outcomes. Not only does 
the type, availability, and wages offered for one's work affect income and living 
conditions, but evidence shows that mortality rates have been shown to be significantly 
increased among temporary workers and those with unstable work arrangements 
(Kivimäki et al., 2003) Temporary work tends to be more dangerous in terms of injury 
risk and exposure to environmental hazards, but it also brings the combined health 
difficulties of increased stress and feelings of insecurity regarding future income and 
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stability. In the cases of migratory work, there can be the additional loss of established 
social networks and an increased propensity for risk-taking behavior (Artazcoz et al., 
2005). Similarly, chronic unemployment and job insecurity have been  associated with 
some forms of health-damaging behavior, such as smoking and alcohol abuse (Ferrie et 
al., 2002). 
 Education levels can directly affect health outcomes. The level of education 
achieved, especially in children, is a key leading indicator of future social positioning, 
and thus, future health risks and opportunities. In the same way, poor health in childhood 
can affect educational opportunities, as sick children can be kept from school, limiting 
their ability to learn at the same rate as their peers (Wilkinson, 2006).  
 While it should be understood that education, like all sub determinants, is very 
closely related to gender and social position, inequities are often expressed most 
profoundly in nations and populations where women's rights are low. In such 
environments, educational opportunities may be more available to males, with females 
achieving lower literacy and graduation rates (Sen et al., 2007). Also, they may be kept at 
home to care for a sick member of the family, in which case poor health and accepted 
gender roles combine to put females at an economic and social disadvantage. In these 
ways, education and a lack of gender equity combine to leave women in a disempowered 
status, with lower earning capability, than males.  
 Urbanization produces mixed health outcomes. The global trend of people 
moving from rural areas and into urban ones can skew the social determinants of health 
in a number of ways. Growing urban areas can produce slums with poor sanitary 
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conditions, a rise in disease prevalence, and more health problems stemming from 
environmental issues (Campbell et al., 2007). Urbanization is also associated with rises in 
alcoholism and substance abuse, possibly stemming from the new social patterns that 
arise when individuals are removed from their established networks (Campbell et al., 
2007). Mortality rates in urban areas also increase in relation to violent crime and suicide, 
with 90% of both occurring in low and middle income countries (Krug et al., 2002). 
 On the other hand, by concentrating wealth and power in major cities, 
urbanization often creates incomes and opportunities within cities that simply aren't 
available in rural areas. This in turn fuels more mobilization, as well as creating situations 
where urban residents enjoy incomes (and access to health systems) not found elsewhere. 
In this way, urbanization helps to reinforce the income and wealth disparities previously 
mentioned (Wilkinson, 1996). 
Understanding Health Risks on a Larger Scale from an SDH Perspective 
 Recognizing that the social and economic conditions that shape the opportunities 
and choices available to individuals will necessarily affect their actions and decisions is a 
critical piece of the SPH framework. It allows us to move beyond the concept of 
individuals behaving in a way that corresponds only to internal motivations and grants 
that there are conditions and constraints that lie beyond their direct control. By examining 
the determinants of health on a wider scale, we can think of populations being more 
vulnerable and susceptible to certain diseases and health outcomes by virtue of the 
conditions under which they live and work (Diderichsen et al., 2001; Solar et al., 2007). 
We can recognize that many of the most pressing health variables for a specific man, 
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woman, or child are externally imposed – or at least strongly influenced – by 
environment, policy, and especially social structure. 
 This represents a minor departure from traditional thinking on health and disease 
prevention. Although a wide body of medical literature recognizes that social 
determinants can be important within nations and societies (especially in the field of 
epidemiology), policy interventions are usually staged and designed at the micro-medical 
level (Marmot et al., 2006). By viewing micro-medical behaviors and risk factors as a 
smaller part of, and natural consequence to, the prevailing social conditions, we can 
arrive at alternate courses of action designed to decrease susceptibility and vulnerability, 
rather than treat medical ailments individually. 
 Undertaking such a view can be necessary, given that the major determinants of 
health, expressed in terms of social position, are often manipulated unintentionally by 
changes in policy or socioeconomic structure at many levels. Frequently, the goal of 
these changes is not to explicitly alter health outcomes (although there may be situations 
where that is the case, as with public health reform). 
 One of the areas where unintended impacts have been most debated is the 
increasing trend toward trade liberalization and neoliberal economic policies, both in the 
Western world and developing nations. Neoliberalism, in this context, can be thought of 
as a set of policies that favor free-market competition – and especially globalization – as 
a way of creating efficiencies in pricing and distribution. This often leads to a decrease in 
tariffs and reduction of other barriers to import and export. The prevailing mindset of 
such policies is that state-managed markets and exchanges create inefficiencies, and 
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therefore are less preferable than more competitive environments that should, in theory, 
lead to sustained economic growth (Woodward et al., 2006; Labonte et al., 2007). 
 These goals and policies have become preferred by major trade, relief, and 
development institutions like the international monetary fund (IMF), the World Bank, 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in recent decades, largely stemming back to a 
consensus achieved in the 1980s. The result, especially in LDCs, has been " policy 
changes that focus on reducing domestic consumption, shrinking the public sector 
through privatizations and cutbacks in government services, and orienting economic 
activity toward export then toward domestic needs" (Collins et al., 2000). Proponents of 
neoliberal policies point out that by earning more, developing countries would 
theoretically both attract direct foreign investment and have more money to make 
payments on existing loans, leading to even more investments in the future. 
 The intertwined success of trade and Gross National Product Per Capita (GDPpc) 
follows a logical thought process. Rises in household income, caloric intake, and life 
expectancy are all correlated with positive GDPpc growth (up to a certain point). Given 
that fact, it could be assumed that any policy that raises incomes at the national level 
should, generally speaking, bode well for health outcomes at the same time (Feachem, 
2001). 
 That assumption holds up fairly well to empirical observations, but only to an 
income level that raises a nation or population to the point where food and shelter are no 
longer immediate concerns. In other words, economic growth has been shown to improve 
health standards, especially when the population in question is currently unable to meet 
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basic needs and thus is vulnerable to starvation, malnutrition, easily-treatable infectious 
diseases, and so on. By raising the incomes and standards of living to the point where a 
minimum standard of nutrition and shelter can be provided for, and the most rudimentary 
preventative measures can be taken, the overall health of a society can be improved. In 
that sense, there does seem to be a "tipping point" between income and health 
(Wilkinson, 2006).  
 A World Bank 1993 report showed that increases of GNP were associated with 
longer life expectancies, but only to a level of around $5,000 per capita in 1990. Beyond 
that point, further GNP growth was no longer associated with greater lifespan. There are 
diminishing returns to income and health outcomes, and they often lie at a point that is far 
lower than the line where most would consider a nation or population to be "wealthy."  
 More to the point, it should be noted that any LEB improvements will not fall 
uniformly across a population, and within any society, the poorest individuals with the 
weakest social networks nearly always have the lowest life expectancies and are more 
susceptible to disease (Wilkinson, 1996).  
 This brings us to one of the major dilemmas surrounding the introduction of 
neoliberal policies, from a social determinants of health viewpoint: Economic growth, 
even when it is successful, does little to alleviate the higher mortality rates and lower 
standards of living that affect those without status and power. Although liberalization and 
the proliferation of "free trade" policies are largely driven and implemented by 
organizations supported by governments and other major stakeholders in the 
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industrialized world, those same organizations are forced to admit that the ties between 
GNPpc performance and improved health outcomes are tenuous. 
 The United Nations' own report on the Social Determinants of Health, finalized in 
2008, acknowledges in the executive summary that "[economic] growth by itself, without 
appropriate social policies to ensure reasonable fairness in the way its benefits are 
distributed, brings little benefit to health equity." 
 Regardless of whether increases in national income can improve health, there is a 
number of ways that neoliberal policies themselves can possibly create, or further 
exaggerate, health inequities.  
The Effects of Liberalization on the Social Determinants of Health 
 Globally, rapid transitions to neoliberal policies have been linked with inequitable 
rises of communicable disease among those lowest on the social position ladder (Dollar, 
2001; Ceukelaire, 2003; Deaton, 2004). One explanation of the failure of neoliberal 
policies to impact health outcomes for the better may be found in the removal of public 
equity from the decision-making process at the national level. Health care is treated like 
any other good, leaving prices and options to the market rather than in the realm of 
government policy. Economic liberalization is often accompanied by the introduction of 
user fees for service and medication. There is strong evidence to show that this 
commercialization in health services leads to larger inequities (Whitehead et al., 2001; 
Hutton, 2004), particularly in low-income countries where the choice between health care 
and basic necessities like food and shelter must be made. Without proper safeguards it is 
probable that the market will under serve the public good in many areas, particularly 
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health care (Barnett, 2002). In the words of development economist Angus Deaton, "As 
far as health is concerned, the market, by itself, is not a substitute for collective action" 
(Deaton, 2004). 
 In a broad sense, neoliberal policies, even when they have been successful in 
raising GDPpc, have had the recognized side effect of increasing disparities in income 
between the wealthiest and poorest. Simply put, they can aggravate the single greatest 
determinant of health by creating a larger space between the haves and have-nots 
(Birdsall, 2006). While the effects on gender and race are typically less straightforward, 
women and minorities are almost always the marginalized parties in any society, meaning 
that they have the least to gain, and the most to lose, by a further transfer of power and 
wealth to those who already have it. 
 By concentrating wealth and power into smaller circles, and shifting employment 
into areas where export-led growth creates jobs, neoliberal polices also have the effect of 
bringing more people into urban areas. Although urbanization is a global trend, and one 
seen in many developing countries, open trade agreements can produce large populations 
of working poor who move rapidly into major urban areas. In this way, the urbanization 
and movement patterns that take place as a result of liberalization are intensified and 
combined with the already mentioned income gap growth. As large numbers of workers 
flow into a city to find low-wage jobs, normal social patterns and standards are often 
disrupted, while at the same time urban incomes may increase rapidly over rural incomes.  
 And so, despite the fact that neoliberal policies are usually associated with net 
economic growth and fewer public debts on the national level, the net effect of these 
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changes, on the whole, have tended to produce worse health outcomes, regardless of the 
level of development of a country. For that reason, it is possible for changes to succeed 
economically but fail at the social level and increase inequities in health. 
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Chapter III: Social Determinants of HIV/AIDS 
 
Although many facets of the SDH approach are still being studied and debated, a 
growing amount of research is concentrating on the interplay between the social 
determinants of health and HIV/AIDS. Aside from representing a global health concern, 
HIV/AIDS, perhaps more than any other disease, conforms tightly to the SDH approach. 
Because two of the most common modes of transmission – sexual intercourse and 
intravenous drug use – could easily be classified as "social" phenomena rather than 
purely medical behavior, the path from determinants to infections is less obscured than it 
might be in epidemics of different types. 
About HIV/AIDS6 
Medical researchers currently believe that HIV/AIDS originated in Western 
Africa as a simian virus (the Simian Immunovirus, or SIV, which affects the sooty 
mangabey, or white collar monkey) (Gao, 1999; al., 2003). The disease then spread to 
humans in that area, who most likely became infected through the hunting and butchering 
of the infected animals. There is some debate about when exactly these first infections 
occurred, but evidence suggests that a limited number of humans were infected in the 
                                                 
6
 Although HIV and AIDS represent separate medical conditions, they will largely be referred to together 
as HIV/AIDS for this study, as they involve different stages of the same disease. The Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) is a retrovirus that leads to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS), which kills by attacking the body‟s immune system. 
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1930s through the 1950s, although these cases were rare, and the deaths mistakenly 
attributed to other causes (Rojanapithayakorn, 2006). The first confirmed case of HIV 
occurred in Congo in 1959, where later analysis of a tissue sample from that year yielded 
a positive result. In the 1960s, however, the virus began infecting greater numbers of 
people.  
HIV began to make its way first through African villages along ground trade 
routes and then overseas. For most of the world, the Caribbean island of Haiti was the 
conduit. It is believed that a single person brought the virus to that nation in 1966, as one 
of a group of workers who had been laboring in Africa (Carter, 2007). From that 
infection, HIV spread through and from Haiti, first appearing in New York most likely 
between 1969 and 1972. Forensic analysis of early U.S. infections suggest that it was 
again a single person who brought the disease from Haiti and into the United States 
(Chong, 30 October 2007). 
Once it was introduced into the U.S. population, however, the virus traveled 
quickly. The virus began to attract the attention of medical professions in New York City 
in 1981, where unusual cases of Kaposi‟s Sarcoma and pneumonia were noted by doctors 
(Sepkowitz, 2006). Within months, it was recognized that a new infectious disease, 
targeted at the body‟s immune system, was responsible. By the end of the year, infections 
of the new and unknown illness were also reported in California and the UK (Sepkowitz, 
2006). 
Today, HIV/AIDS is a global health care crisis. More than 5 million people have 
died from the disease, and more than 40 million have been infected. Ninety-five percent 
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of all new infections are in the developing world (Collins et al., 2000), especially in 
Southeast Asia and Sub Saharan Africa, where infections have moved far beyond the 
traditional “high risk” groups of prostitutes, gay men, and needle drug users to high rates 
of infection in heterosexual men, their partners, and children. In fact, although male-to-
male sexual contact and intravenous drug use remain common pathways of transmission 
for HIV/AIDS for much of the globe, within the most-affected regions of Sub Saharan 
Africa and Southeast Asia, a higher proportion of new infections can be traced from sex 
workers to their male clients, from heterosexual men to their spouses, and from women to 
children
7
 (Collins et al., 2000).  
 Two details in this brief history should receive special attention. The first is that, 
perhaps more than any other communicable disease that has been studied so far, 
HIV/AIDS truly has a strong social component. Although the disease first appeared in the 
late 1900s, it did not become a widespread cause of death until other contributing factors 
(in this case, shared needle drug uses and "risky" sexual practices) contributed to create 
new pathways of transmission. Secondly, at a time when there was low information about 
the disease, it only took a single person to carry infections from one population to 
another. Unlike other diseases, which may cause immediate and visible signs of infection 
like coughing, sores, etc., HIV/AIDS shows no immediate symptoms, so without the 
                                                 
7
 Differences in HIV/AIDS transmission pathways in the developing world can be partially explained by 
the presence of different HIV viral subtypes than are typically seen in industrialized countries, but also 
from the lower general health, poor nutrition, and presence of other STIs, which make both men and 
women susceptible to infection (Stillwaggon, 2002). 
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proper preventative measures and precautions, entire communities face an increased risk 
of exposure. 
Treatment of HIV/AIDS 
 There is, as of yet, no cure for HIV/AIDS, although antiretroviral therapy (ARTs) 
can significantly slow its progress. Without access to ARTs, an infected individual will 
typically survive six to eight years, although there is evidence that suggests these 
averages will vary greatly depending on nutrition, general health, and the presence of 
other illnesses (Stillwaggon, 2002). With ART cocktails, which are readily available in 
the developed world, an infected person can expect to live two decades, and possibly 
much longer. It should also be noted that new studies show persons taking ARTs may be 
up to 250 times less likely to infect other individuals, due to the lower viral load found in 
their bloodstream. 
 As no cure for HIV/AIDS exists, the focus on fighting the disease, from a medical 
standpoint, lies largely in preventative micro-medical measures. These include 100% 
condom campaigns and clean needle exchanges among "high-risk groups" like sex 
workers, needle drug users, and homosexual men. The implementation of these 
campaigns around the world has curbed the spread of the disease considerably in most 
areas. One criticism of these efforts, however, is that they tend to pay little attention to 
the social economic context in which people live, especially in LDCs where little 
information exists and behavioral changes may be hard to enact on a societal level 
(Collins et al., 2000). 
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 In fact, even in the developed world, preventative measures that are based solely 
on behavior modification may present themselves as unrealistic solutions. In 1999, a 
UNDP report noted "inner-city poor neighborhoods often shelter vigorous drug trade, 
numerous opportunities for strangers to engage in drug-mediated, unprotected sex, and 
worse locations where these and other risk behaviors go virtually unchallenged." That 
assessment didn't arise from a neighborhood in Southeast Asia or Sub Saharan Africa, but 
one located in an urban area in the  United States (Collins et al., 2000). 
 
Defining HIV/AIDS Risk through SDH 
Despite those criticisms, the micro-medical approach has been unquestionably 
effective in stopping progress of HIV/AIDS in many parts of the world, and it is 
important to view the SDH approach as building on top of these measures rather than 
replacing them.  
This is especially pertinent in the case of HIV/AIDS, where it is immediately 
recognized that promoting condom use and proliferating antiretroviral treatments  are 
crucial to combating the disease on the individual level (Barnett et al., 2000). To suggest 
that frontline measures are unnecessary would be more than irresponsible. Still, there is 
an overwhelming case to be made that these tactics are not wholly sufficient in and of 
themselves. From an SDH perspective, stopping the spread of a virus medically is 
necessary, but exploring the reasons behind an epidemic that spreads particularly quickly 
throughout a nation or region is beneficial as well. 
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Alongside high-risk “groups” and “activities” as defined by medical providers in 
relation to HIV, the SDH approach focuses on high-risk  HIV/AIDS situations (Zwi et al., 
1991) that lead to individual behaviors and coincide with HIV/AIDS pandemics around 
the world (see Table 2). Whereas intravenous drug use and male-to-male sexual contact 
pose great dangers of HIV/AIDS transmission on the personal, micro level, the worst 
regional epidemics have been associated with migrant labor, poor access to health care, 
rapid urbanization, and a prevalence of commercial sex work stemming from a lack of 
alternative employment in Africa and Asia (Wilson et al., 1990). None of these links is 
hard to interpret or understand, yet they fall outside the traditional range of concerns in 
the fight against HIV/AIDS. 
 And so, SDH proponents must return to the causes of causes, searching for the 
motivations that might lead individuals to engage in so-called "high risk" activities. 
Individual behavior might still be at the root of bigger trends, but macro conditions often 
set the stage for certain behaviors by encouraging or discouraging them. The connections 
between individual behaviors that lead to increased HIV/AIDS exposure and prevailing 
social and economic situations are often straightforward. For example, a lack of access to 
quality health care can be thought of as a macro condition, whereas untreated sores or 
other symptoms of sexually transmitted diseases (one inevitable byproduct of an under-
serving health care system) can be seen as directly encouraging transmission by exposing 
more people to an increase of blood and other bodily fluids. This, in turn, increases the 
risk of HIV/AIDS as well as many other elements for all members of a given community 
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 Recall that a key point to be made is that behavior is largely socially determined. 
Biological factors may be  responsible for the presence of the disease, but prevailing 
social and economic conditions in their actions create the pathways in which the disease 
can spread itself through population (Barnett et al., 2000). Viewed in that light, 
HIV/AIDS risk is " characteristic of the environment rather than individuals or the 
particular practices" (Barnett et al., 2002). Using needle-injected drugs is considered 
"risky" behavior for HIV/AIDS transmission, but it only became so after the introduction 
of that particular virus; the existing social circumstances created pathways and should be 
considered as much a root cause as the introduction of the disease itself.  
Likewise, prostitution can be viewed as an activity or occupation engaged in by 
an individual. Clearly, trading sex for money is a very high-risk behavior. But what 
factors promote such behavior? Low information, lack of access to other career 
opportunities, and the presence of wealthier migrant or foreign populations clearly 
increase the odds that the men, women, and children living in a society will choose 
prostitution or other dangerous occupations as a means of supporting themselves and 
their families, as it will the odds that customers will seek out sex workers (Fenton, 2004; 
Göran, 2009). These are all "high-risk behaviors," but ones that can easily be predicted to 
occur in a high-risk environment. 
HIV/AIDS Susceptibility and Vulnerability 
In regard to existing literature on the SDH of HIV/AIDS, two important concepts 
– the assessment of susceptibility and vulnerability as well as the identification of high-
risk situations – need to be brought into a more specific light. 
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The SDH approach examines the “risk” of HIV/AIDS in two specific ways: the 
susceptibility of a population – an increased likelihood of transmission, whether at the 
national, population group, or household level – to the illness, and the vulnerability to its 
effects. In other words, it recognizes that some groups are at increased odds for 
contracting HIV/AIDS and that others will, by the nature of their circumstances, be 
impacted more firmly by infections and illness (Barnett et al., 2000) (see Table 3). 
 Some of the identified factors that increase a population or society‟s susceptibility 
to HIV/AIDS include changes in population movements, certain sexual practices or 
beliefs, and an unequal distribution in income (Barnett et al., 2000). These are fairly easy 
to comprehend, as they erode established social norms, create opportunities for variance 
in traditional sexual behaviors, and encourage risk-taking on the part of displaced or 
disadvantaged communities and individuals. 
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Table 3: Social Determinants of HIV/AIDS 
 
(Barnett et al., 2000) 
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. Vulnerability, on the other hand, focuses on the effects of the virus. A household 
with one income source, whose sole earning value revolves around hourly wages, will 
necessarily be more affected by an illness to that person (or someone that person could 
miss work to care for) than a household where there are multiple earners with several 
streams of income. Likewise, a group with several cohesive members will most likely 
have an easier time caring for their sick than a household or community where each 
member is effectively looking after their own concerns. And while this analogy is 
presented in a way that describes the vulnerability of a handful of people, the same 
dynamic rings true on a larger scale. A society that is dependent on a few people, or 
labor-intensive industries, will likely be more affected by an HIV/AIDS epidemic than 
one that isn‟t. 
 Having made the distinction between susceptibility and vulnerability, it should be 
noted that the two commonly go hand in hand. Indeed, many LDCs, Cambodia included, 
find themselves unfortunately positioned as both highly susceptible to an HIV/AIDS 
epidemic and vulnerable to its effects. However, to reiterate, it is not simply a case of the 
poor getting sicker.  
In fact, the two greatest factors in predicting the susceptibility and vulnerability to 
HIV/AIDS infections appear to be the disparity of wealth within a society and the degree 
of social cohesion that it enjoys. Thus, even within the United States, a wealthy nation by 
any measurable standard, there lie populations (especially in urban areas) that are 
considered especially susceptible to HIV/AIDS infections.  
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Some of the factors contributing to HIV/AIDS susceptibility, such as the 
availability of health education, coincide directly with SDH factors for overall health, 
while others are more specific to the disease (Zwi et al., 1991). Some of the determinants 
unique to HIV/AIDS are shown on Table 3 (Barnett et al., 2000). A few bear a closer 
look, as they relate directly to our study of Cambodia. 
 Income distribution is generally more important than wealth. Interestingly, 
the national or regional incomes earned seem to account for less, in terms of HIV/AIDS 
epidemics, than the disparities that exist between rich and poor (Göran, 2009). While this 
is true in terms of all health outcomes at the national level, HIV/AIDS prevalence 
correlates more sharply to income inequity, even for LDCs that have yet to reach the 
$5,000 GDPpc level where LBE increases.  
 It could be assumed that an individual in a wealthier country with a strong health 
care network will usually enjoy greater access to preventative measures, and stronger 
treatment options, than his or her third-world counterpart, but these comparisons don‟t 
always hold up, especially on the national level (Stillwaggon, 2002). There have been 
surprisingly strong epidemics in relatively “wealthy” areas of Africa and Asia, while 
many of their poorer neighbors have been able to keep infection rates low (Fenton, 2004; 
Göran, 2009). 
 Evidence suggests that this may be due to the fact that larger disparities between 
rich and poor encourage migration, urbanization, and some of the other HIV/AIDS 
determinants, as well as restricting health care to those who can afford it and creating 
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incentives for risk-taking behavior among the poor (Collins, 2001; Gazin et al., 2006; 
Holmqvist, 2009). Medical anthropologist Paul Farmer summarizes this dynamic nicely: 
 [Risk behaviors], unless carefully contextualized, also exaggerate individual 
agency, and leave unacknowledged unexplained ways in which large-scale social and 
economic factor structure risk for individuals and groups, particularly those who are 
systematically marginalized from power and from access to the goods, services, and 
opportunities which power ensures... Poverty cannot be just another cofactor along 
biological considerations, gender inequality, and cultural considerations (Farmer et al., 
1993). 
 Gender rights can directly affect the spread of HIV/AIDS. Women are 
especially vulnerable to HIV/AIDS infection in many parts of the world because of their 
marginalized role. This is particularly true in many LDCs, where cultural norms dictate 
that females occupy a lower social status than men. This increases their HIV/AIDS risk in 
a number of ways. In the home, they may not be able to control the timing and/or 
conditions for sexual encounters, meaning that preventative HIV/AIDS measures may not 
be available to them. 
 In the workplace, societies with low amounts of gender equality often place 
women at a disadvantage in the economy because they have lower levels of education 
and may earn less money for comparable work in the marketplace regardless of their 
qualifications. For these reasons, large numbers of women are forced into sex work (be it 
in formal or informal settings) where they are at greatly increased risk for attracting 
HIV/AIDS as well as other STIs. 
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 Women may also face increased exposure when cultural gender inequalities create 
opportunities for males to solicit sex workers outside the home, increasing the odds that 
they will spread HIV/AIDS to their spouses and unborn children (Barnett et al., 2000).  
 Social cohesion and cultural norms can affect HIV/AIDS transmission 
pathways in unique ways. Traditional religious and sexual mixing patterns can exert a 
heavy influence on individual behavior and may partially explain why some relatively 
wealthier nations (South Africa, for instance) struggle to reduce HIV/AIDS infection 
rates and others, such as Iran or Senegal, do not.  
 For example, in some areas of Africa and the Middle East, there are religious 
norms that may deter sexual contact outside of socially acceptable partnerships and 
arrangements. In many HIV/AIDS affected regions, however, there are long-established 
routines that encourage HIV/AIDS transmission, including the acceptance of prostitution, 
genital mutilation, and sex with multiple and concurrent partners. A change or breakdown 
in any of these cultural norms may change the sexual mixing patterns within 
communities, often creating opportunities for greater numbers of partners or sexual 
encounters that are based on relative power and economic need. This behavior, in turn, 
creates greater opportunities for the spread of HIV/AIDS (Barnett et al., 2000). 
 Increased urbanization is associated with rises in HIV/AIDS prevalence. The 
tie between urbanization and HIV/AIDS seems to rest on a number of factors, most 
notably as a way of measuring cultural cohesiveness. Changing living patterns remove 
individuals from their families and established social traditions, which can lead to 
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increases in alcohol and drug abuse as well as new sexual mixing patterns that are less 
exclusive than existing societal norms.  
 Urbanization may also create both incentives and demand for sex work, especially 
when migratory or temporary labor is involved (as with Export Production Zones). Not 
only do such arrangements separate men and women from their established social 
networks and sexual partners, but they may create larger wealth disparities, as incomes in 
urban areas tend to be much higher than those in rural areas. These sorts of shifts can be 
sudden in third-world areas, where both males and females move to urban areas to seek 
higher wages, although regular employment is less assured, especially for females, who 
may resort to formal or informal sex work in order to maintain or replace lost wages 
(Nishigaya, 2002; Hor et al., 2005). 
 Additionally, urbanization in the developing world is often tied to increased 
mobility. Evidence from parts of Africa suggests that the introduction of roads, airports, 
sea ports, and other forms of mobility can help to trigger an HIV/AIDS epidemic, and 
poverty-driven labor migration is tied to increased HIV/AIDS prevalence in both men 
and women (Fenton, 2004). In part, this can be traced to increased exposure to the disease 
from outside the community. But, as with urbanization and cultural dissonance, it may 
also break individuals from cultural and sexual norms, while at the same time encourage 
migrant workforces that frequent sex workers during the time that they are away from 
home (Stillwaggon, 2002).  
 Access to health care affects both vulnerability and susceptibility to 
HIV/AIDS. As the early success of micro-medical programs would suggest, the 
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availability of health services within a community is a strong determinant of future 
HIV/AIDS incidence. On the preventative level, strong health networks can halt new 
infections by educating the public about transmission risks, test and screen individuals to 
make them aware of their HIV status, remove HIV-positive samples from blood banks, 
and treat related STIs that increase the odds of HIV transmission. Additionally, a strong 
network of healthcare providers can properly diagnose AIDS and contribute to accurate 
record-keeping and forecasting, which remains a challenge in much of the developing 
world.  
 In terms of treatment, there is no cure yet for HIV/AIDS, but the availability of 
antiretroviral medications can have an enormous impact on the lifespan of an infected 
person as well as their probability of infecting others. The ability to treat the disease and 
its symptoms, however, varies greatly from one region of the world to the next and from 
one population to another, stemming from the relatively high cost of ARV cocktails. 
With these medications, an infected person can live more than a decade while still 
contributing economically to a household or society, but without them, life expectancy is 
only a few years.  
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Chapter IV: Cambodia and HIV/AIDS  
About Cambodia 
 Cambodia is a small country situated on the Southeast Asian Peninsula between 
Thailand and Vietnam (see Figure 2). Sometimes referred to historically by an alternative 
spelling, Kampuchea, at 180,000 square kilometers, it is roughly the same size as 
Missouri. It has roughly 14 million inhabitants, 90% of whom are Khmer (ethnic 
Cambodians), with Chinese, Vietnamese and Thai residents as the significant minorities. 
Buddhism is the dominant religion, with Khmer being the most widely spoken language 
(although French and English are also prevalent). Politically, the nation is arranged as a 
multiparty democracy under a constitutional monarchy (State, 2008). 
 Demographically, Cambodia looks similar to many other war-torn third world 
nations. Despite 6% GDP growth over the last ten years, mainly due to peaceful 
conditions and foreign investment (Bank, 2008), poverty remains pervasive. Between 40 
and 45 percent of the population lives below the poverty line
8
 (Beresford et al., 2004), 
with the majority of those (18.5% of all residents) surviving on less than one dollar per 
day (Bank, 2008). Even these numbers are skewed, as the 20% of all citizens living in 
urban areas typically enjoy higher incomes than their rural counterparts (Beresford et al., 
                                                 
8
 Cambodia has not yet set an official poverty line; however, a baseline profile has been established by the 
World Bank, based on minimum caloric intake and other benchmarks for the Southeast Asian region. While 
it has already been noted that up to 45% of all citizens currently live below this line, it should also be 
pointed out that a large number live just above it, as well (Beresford et al., 2004). 
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2004). With few paved roads, and the low availability of services like clean water and 
electricity, Cambodia ranks 130 out of 175 nations in terms of development (Beresford et 
al., 2004). Subsistence farming, mainly of rice, supplies the means for most of the 
country, while tourism and the garment industry provide the main engines for economic 
growth (Bank, 2008). 
Cambodia’s History 
It would be impossible to understand the current social, economic, and political 
landscape in Cambodia without first briefly considering its unique and turbulent history.  
Organized as an empire for centuries, during which time it briefly flourished and 
the famed temples at Angkor Wat were constructed, Cambodia‟s modern history begins 
with the arrival of French missionaries in the eighteenth century (Chandler, 2000). The 
nation quickly became a French protectorate, supplying teakwood to France in exchange 
for protection from neighboring rulers in Vietnam and Thailand. This arrangement 
persisted until 1953, when the French, who had been losing influence throughout World 
War II (which had seen the Japanese effectively govern Cambodia), agreed to transfer 
power to the reigning sovereign.  
 Cambodia‟s leaders inherited a difficult situation. To the east, the communist 
revolution in Vietnam had taken hold. By the early 1960s, a state of outright civil war 
existed between the communists in the North and the U.S.-led Southern forces. Unable to 
remain neutral, they secretly agreed to allow transit of Vietnamese forces, and in 1969 the 
U.S. began a bombardment of border villages as part of the effort against the North 
Vietnamese military supply chain. Over one hundred thousand tons of bombs were 
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dropped on the Cambodian countryside over the next four years, killing hundreds of 




Figure 2 : Political map of Cambodia 
  
 47 
 Following a coup in the Cambodian capital, the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
(CPK) started to gain ground in the countryside. Led by Pol Pot, the movement took on 
its own momentum, controlling 60% of the territory by 1973. Finally, on New Year‟s 
Day in 1975, the rebels launched an offensive at the remaining areas of government 
control – mainly the larger cities and major transportation centers – that collapsed the 
existing government. The last government forces surrendered in April, when the rebel 
army entered Phnom Penh.  
 Victory over the government marked the beginning of Cambodia‟s well-known 
history under the CPK, or Khmer Rouge (Red Khmer). Seeking to create a communist 
agricultural utopia, the CPK‟s first act was to evacuate all cities. Millions of people, 
especially those living in Phnom Penh and Battambang, were moved into the countryside 
to be reassigned to farming work. In another aspect of the purge, citizens with ties to the 
former government or military were executed, as were most academics and professionals. 
Private property was abolished, along with religion, banking, and currency (Chandler, 
2000).  
As part of the CPK‟s “four-year plan,” in which the country‟s net rice exports 
would be tripled (thereby paving the way for improvements in industry and 
infrastructure), most men and women were forced to work ten to twelve hours a day. 
These efforts failed to achieve their intended effect, however, and an estimated two 
million people, representing one-fifth of the population, died as a result of the policies. 
Many of these deaths are attributed to overwork, fatigue, disease, starvation and 
malnutrition. An additional one hundred thousand were executed, either because they 
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were thought to oppose the new government, had ties to the former regime, or even were 
party insiders suspected of being traitors.  
  The internal pressures of dissent and famine were soon matched by external 
problems. The CPK, which saw itself as separate from the communist movement in 
Vietnam, began raids on Vietnamese territories. In response, the Vietnamese invaded 
Cambodia on Christmas Day 1978, moving through the country so quickly that within 
days they were closing on Phnom Penh. After securing the capital, they moved quickly to 
install a government made of Khmer exiles and citizens free of CPK associations. With 
political stability under foreign rule, some normalcy returned, bringing slow 
developments in commerce, agriculture, and infrastructure until the Vietnamese army‟s 
departure in 1992. No longer the recipient of Soviet aid itself, Vietnam removed its last 
30,000 soldiers, leaving the United Nations to continue the rebuilding effort. 
 While these events are fading into Cambodia‟s history, they still cast a long 
shadow over the country‟s social and economic landscape. One notable effect is the 
nearly complete lack of intellectual capital in several fields needed for sustained growth 
and social improvement. For instance, it is estimated that there were roughly 1,000 
doctors working in Cambodia at the time the Khmer Rouge took power; when the 
Vietnamese army arrived four years later, there were 14 (Fraser, 2005). This ongoing 
shortage of medical professionals represents an important contributing factor in 
Cambodia‟s HIV/AIDS situation, and they are similarly deficient in teachers, engineers, 
lawyers, and other professional groups. 
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 After a summit in Paris, it was decided that United Nations Transitional Authority 
in Cambodia (UNTAC) would assume control on a military and peacekeeping mission 
(Curtis; Curtis, 1993). Along with a hefty aid package, to the tune of $2 billion, came an 
influx of foreigners and new ideas. Their immediate aims were clear: to disarm the 
militias and put an end to the fighting that was still pervasive throughout the countryside, 
repatriate the hundreds of thousands of refugees still arriving in their homeland, begin 
reconstituting the country‟s ailing infrastructure, and pave the way for free and open 
elections (Curtis, 1993). 
The mission, which entailed more than 16,000 soldiers and 7,000 civilians 
(Curtis, 1993), was a qualified success. While the fighting didn‟t cease completely, a 
transitional government made up of the ruling powers and major opposition parties was 
put into place, followed by elections in which more than 90% of the population 
participated (Chandler, 1996; Downie et al., 2001).  
The arrival of foreigners and their money, however, began to warp the Cambodian 
economy, especially in the capital city of Phnom Penh. With UNTAC‟s program budget 
rivaling the nation‟s existing GDP, inflation spiraled in the capital. Rents began to rise 
steadily (Curtis, 1993; Chandler, 1996). Wages, especially for those few Khmer with 
more than a primary education or multilingual skills, matched pace. By offering income 
that was several times what a citizen could make in public service (and roughly 15 times 
the national average), the UN drew into employment Cambodians who might have found 
employment in other areas – including medicine and education (Curtis, 1993; Beresford 
et al., 2004). At the same time, Western-style hotels and restaurants, financed by 
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foreigners, began to spring up around the city. In short, the gap in income and resources 
between those living in the urban capital and those in the countryside began to exaggerate 
itself, drawing more young people into the city.  
The UNTAC mission ended in November of 1993, handing control of the country 
back to its newly-elected leaders, many of whom had already been in power as part of the 
CPK before the project began. The trend of foreign development and policy advisement 
remained in full force, however. The United Nations, in establishing the Millennium 
Development Goals for Least Developed Countries (United Nations. Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. et al., 2005), continues to be a driving force 
in Cambodia‟s administration. Likewise, investment from overseas has only continued, 
based mainly on the cheap labor and natural resources that the country boasts.  
In short, the end of the UNTAC period transitioned Cambodia into what it is 
today – a culture and economy that is evolving on unsteady ground. Their struggle to join 
the modern world is both guided and sometimes overshadowed by the hundreds of social 
and economic experts living in the capital, who represent an economy in and of 
themselves. 
Health Care in Cambodia 
 A few brief points should be made about the current state of health care, and its 
availability, within Cambodia, as they relate to the rest of this study. Coverage by 
doctors, nurses, and facilities is sparse. A 1999 survey showed that only 12% of rural 
villages had clinics, and an even lower 4% had regular access to a medical doctor 
(Beresford et al., 2004).  
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 Government health expenditures amount to 19.3% of all health care expenditures, 
with private expenditures (mostly come in the form of donors and international relief 
agencies) making up the remaining 80.7% (Beresford et al., 2004). Due to the low wages 
paid to medical workers (around $10-$15 per month), informal payments made to 
healthcare providers and pharmacies make up a substantial part of the Cambodian 
healthcare system (Hardeman et al., 2004; Jacobs et al., 2004).  
HIV/AIDS in Cambodia  
The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Cambodia has been one of the most rapid and widespread 
seen anywhere outside Sub Saharan Africa. The first HIV infection in Cambodia came 
during a 1991 screening of donated blood (Organization, 2001). It was two years later, in 
1993, that the country‟s ministry of health diagnosed its first case of AIDS (Organization, 
2001). Fifteen cases were reported within the next year, and within only five years, in 
1998, a staggering 3.6% of the population was estimated to be infected
9
 (Bith, 2004) (see 
Table 4).  
It has not been lost on many observers that the beginnings of HIV/AIDS within 
the kingdom roughly coincided with the UNTAC mission. While it is a common 
                                                 
9
 Any statistical data regarding Cambodia, and especially those that represent aggregates for the country, 
should be considered useful within the context but not altogether reliable. Given the pervasive poverty, 
extensive corruption, widespread illiteracy, and lack of reliable government offices and officials, 
Cambodian health records – like those of many third-world countries – are notably inconsistent (Attaran, 
2005).  
In some areas, even births and deaths are not accurately recorded, and these difficulties have shown 
themselves in Cambodia‟s fight against HIV/AIDS. For instance, UNAIDS has been forced to revise its 
own estimates several times, as various surveys have offered conflicting viewpoints of the crisis. 
Regardless of the specific numbers cited, however, it should be clear to the reader that the HIV/AIDS crisis 
in Cambodia has been severe. 
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misconception that prostitution began in Cambodia with the arrival of the UN – it had 
had been noted and recorded in the kingdom for hundreds of years (Kaye Sung Chon, 
2003) – it is true that the practice was outlawed and virtually eliminated under the Khmer 
Rouge, only to explode again with the arrival of foreign troops and professionals. The 
Cambodian Women‟s Development Association estimated that the number of prostitutes 
in the country rose from around 6,000 to more than 25,000 during the years UNTAC 
oversaw its affairs (Whitworth, 2007). They also documented a sharp rise in prostitution 
in provincial villages away from the capital city, and child prostitution (Whitworth, 
2007).   
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Table 4 : HIV Seroprevalence
1













Provinces (Prevalence %) (Prevalence %) (Prevalence %) (Prevalence 
%) 1 Banteay Meanchey 26.7 5.3 3.3 2.0 
2 Battambang 29.5 9.3 3.3 1.8 
3 Kampong Cham 17.3 14.7 2.2 2.1 
4 Kampong Chhang 24.0 10.0 2.0 1.5 
5 Kampong Speu 20.4 (–) 2 1.9 2.8 
6 Kampong Thom 26.7 14.0 1.2 2.1 
7 Kampot 19.5 16.9 1.2 1.6 
8 Kandal 16.8 12.4 2.8 1.6 
9 Koh Kong 29.0 2.4 12.8 2.5 
10 Kratie 11.1 1.6 1.2 0.5 
11 Oddar Meanchey 25.5 21.1 (--) (--) 
12 Pailin 29.0 9.1 5.8 2.7 
13 Phnom Penh 23.8 14.0 4.0 1.7 
14 Preah Vihear 19.6 10.3 1.2 1.1 
15 Prey Veng 13.8 9.5 2.0 1.8 
16 Pursat 23.4 14.8 2.0 1.3 
17 Ratanak Kiri 21.6 (–) 3 2.2 1.1 
18 Sieam Reap 24.5 18.0 2.9 2.9 
19 Sihanouk Ville 15.3 19.2 4.0 2.7 
20 Stung Treng 24.1 (--) 1.6 1.9 
21 Svay Rieng 9.1 15.4 2.2 1.4 
22 Takeo 29.2 11.9 2.1 1.1 
 
Source: Sobheap et al. (2006a). 
1. All data adjusted for quality control. Police and antenatal care clinics data were smoothed with 
estimations and projections package. 
2. (-) denotes number too small to produce reliable estimates. 
3. (--) denotes that data were available for only one year and that smoothed estimates could not be 
generated. 
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As the reconstruction efforts fueled a rise in urban incomes, especially in Phnom 
Penh, young people flocked to the cities. However, not all of these new workers were 
able to find employment with UNTAC or the dozens of other NGOs that were springing 
up. Perhaps it was inevitable, then, that between Cambodia‟s unusual demographics10 and 
the influx of unattached foreigners with currency to spend, an active sex trade market 
would spring into being. The increase in prostitution brought with it new HIV infections. 
Within months, the number of infected sex workers soared, in some areas rising to over 
50% (Saphonn et al., 2004), and the disease began to make its way into the local and 
foreign populations. 
Indeed, the medical officer of UNTAC mission at the time predicted that seven 
times more soldiers would die from AIDS than from combat duty (Whitworth, 2007). 
This may have been an accurate forecast; one hundred cases of HIV infection among UN 
personnel were recorded, although it‟s not known how many personnel became infected 
and didn‟t know or report it. Locals, too, came to associate the epidemic with foreigners. 
Prime Minister Hun Sen echoed that view when responding to a question of what he 
thought the legacy of the UNTAC mission would be. His reply: “AIDS” (Findlay, 1995; 
Gorbach et al., 2000). 
Despite having gone a relatively long amount of time without reporting their first 
infection
11
, Cambodia quickly became the southeastern Asian nation with the worst 
                                                 
10
 As of 1993, coming out of the civil war, roughly 65% of Cambodia's adult population was female, and 
many women were finding themselves as the heads of their households for the first time, mostly owing to 
the greater proportion of men killed in the civil fighting (Curtis 1993).  
 
11
 The first cases of HIV/AIDS came to the region in 1984 (Mann, 1992). 
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HIV/AIDS epidemic. The first infections were found in traditional high-risk groups, sex 
workers and intravenous drug users (Narain, 2004), but the virus appeared shortly after in 
lower risk groups like heterosexual couples and children, where it continues to spread 
today (Mills et al., 2005). The main transmissions for HIV transmission in Cambodia are 
through intravenous drug use, commercial sex work, and from female workers to male 
clients who contract HIV/AIDS while away from their families and in turn pass it back to 
their spouses and children (Organization, 2001). In fact, nearly half of all new HIV 
infections in Cambodia are among married women, and one-third are from mothers to 
newborn infants (UNAIDS, 2008). 
One reason for the particularly strong growth of the epidemic in Cambodia can be 
traced to lack of public knowledge about preventative measures, and indeed the disease 
itself. Most of those infected in the first ten years didn‟t even know they had the virus. 
For example,  in 2004, among an estimated 160,000 persons infected, less than 10,000 
were aware of their status (Bith, 2004). It should come as no surprise, then, that those 
persons unknowingly continued to spread the virus quickly.  
The immediate response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Cambodia was modeled 
after similar efforts in other countries, most notably Thailand (Cohen, 2003). With 
similar populations and cultures – although by no means identical, especially with regard 
to infrastructure and education – it made sense to treat the situations in the two Southeast 
Asian countries in a similar way. The neighboring country, which had its first diagnosed 
case of AIDS in 1984, had also faced a chain of transmission that began with sex workers 
and intravenous drug users and made its way into the larger population. 
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 At its peak, the epidemic in Thailand saw 2.4% of the population HIV positive, 
including 40% infection in high-risk groups (i.e., sex workers and needle drug users) 
(Narain, 2004). By the mid-1990s however, infection rates seemed to have leveled off 
and began to decrease. Micro-medical measures, especially a 100% condom use 
campaign, have been credited with the decrease (Cohen, 2003; Rojanapithayakorn, 2006). 
 The Royal Government of Cambodia established a national AIDS committee in 
1993, later changing its name in 1998 to the National Center for HIV/AIDS, 
Dermatology and STDs, or NCHADS. The first order of business was to arrange a similar 
program to the one that had been put in place in Thailand, namely health education and 
prevention measures among high-risk groups. In practice, these amounted to a 100% 
condom campaign among sex workers, screening of transfused blood, and a reduction in 
the number of shared needles between intravenous drug users (Saphonn et al., 2004). 
The 100% condom campaign, introduced in 1998, met with limited success. 
Although the educational measures (largely carried out by the western consultants and 
NGOs) effectively reached large number of sex workers in the urban and provincial 
areas, many openly admitted to continuing to have transactional sex without protection. 
Among the reasons given for their reluctance was pressure from customers (Sopheab et 
al., 2008). That is, many workers stated that their clientele preferred not to use condoms, 
so they consented out of fear for lost income (Wong et al., 2003). 
An additional factor hampering preventative measures was found in apathy 
toward the future. Since many of the women polled had little hope for long and fulfilling 
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lives, the specter of a "far away" event like an HIV/AIDS infection was not a significant 
deterrent to short-term risk-taking behavior (Wong et al., 2003). 
And finally, the program has been particularly limited in its scope. Because it is 
targeted directly to "sex workers," it has missed a significant portion of the female 
population engaged in some form of indirect prostitution, including, "sweethearts," "bar 
girls," and so on, of which there are estimated to be more than 20,000 in Cambodia 
(Saphonn et al., 2004). This continues to be a major challenge, as UNAIDS has noted a 
sharp increase among women engaging in paid sex work outside of brothels. 
Interestingly, many of these women do not consider themselves sex workers (Kim et al., 
2005; UNAIDS, 2008). 
These programs, endorsed by the Ministry of Health and carried out largely 
through the funding and logistical support of relief agencies and NGOs, have made a 
recognizable impact since they began in 1995. In fact, there are an estimated 75,000 
people currently living with HIV/AIDS in Cambodia, representing 1.1% of the 
population (UNAIDS, 2008)
12
. While this leaves Cambodia with the highest infection 
                                                 
12
 Even these raw numbers can be somewhat misleading. A person who contracts HIV/AIDS in Cambodia, 
especially in a rural area, faces grim odds of surviving more than a few years. Considering that many aren‟t 
even aware of their infected status (Bith, 2004), and that few options for any form of medical treatment, 
much less antiretroviral therapy, are available outside the larger cities, it is perhaps not surprising that many 
die within a few years (Saphonn et al., 2004). 
Obviously, this is devastating on a social and economic level. Statistically, however, it has served to 
artificially lower the country‟s HIV/AIDS infection rate; as large numbers of infected persons pass away, 
the epidemic has the appearance of having “run its course,” even though the underlying transmission risks 
remain, and perhaps are even increasing.  
Less than 3% of all Cambodians living with HIV were taking antiretroviral therapy in 2004 (Bith, 2004). 
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rate in the region, many view the reduction in overall rates as proof that current micro-
medical efforts to the fight the epidemic have been an unqualified success (Organization, 
2001; Cohen, 2003; Saphonn et al., 2004; Mills et al., 2005).  
Rebuilding the Cambodian Economy with Garments 
From the first days of the UNTAC mission, the liberalization of Cambodia‟s 
economy has been a major aim of policymakers in the kingdom, both internally and from 
Western advisors. To that end, free market principles were scripted into the constitution 
for the Cambodian Royal Government, sponsored and accepted by the United Nations in 
1993 (Downie et al., 2001). 
As an impoverished, war-torn nation, Cambodia held little in the way of 
infrastructure, technology base, or any of the other building blocks of a modern economy. 
It had no factories or production facilities, little in the way of natural resources for export, 
and few citizens with any technical expertise (Beresford et al., 2004). However, what the 
county did boast was large amounts of available unskilled labor, wages that were 
substantially lower than even the surrounding nations, and favorable tax conditions for 
foreign investment (Beresford et al., 2004). From those beginnings, the Cambodian 
garment industry was born.  
At the time when Cambodia's economy was opening, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was, in essence, limiting the amount of textile and garment 
imports that firms in industrialized countries could bring in from a single nation, in an 
effort to shield domestic economies from drastically cheaper overseas competition 
(Bargawi, 2005). Manufacturers, in response, looked for new places to produce in (and 
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export from). Cambodia, with its large pool of cheap, untrained labor, was a natural 
choice. 
With low average incomes pervasive throughout the country, few skills necessary 
to obtain factory work, and lack of other options for employment, garments quickly 
became the backbone of the Cambodian economy. From the first 20 garment factories 
that opened in 1995 (which generated $20 million income13), production expanded to the 
point where Cambodia was home to more than 200 factories only five years later. By the 
year 2000, garments represented more than 90% of all of Cambodia's exports, employing 
more than 200,000 people – mostly young girls from rural provinces (Bargawi, 2005) 
(see Table 5 : Export Oriented Garments Industry in Cambodia (2003) & Figure 3: The 
Growth of the Garment Industry in Cambodia, 1995-2005)Figure 1. 
                                                 
13
 It should be noted that figures in this study will be quoted in U.S. dollars. This is practical for a number 
of reasons. The first, obviously, is to make the figures more accessible to the reader. At the same time, most 
of the accounting done within the kingdom, especially relating to trade figures and estimates of economic 
activity, is done by Western relief agencies that prefer to denominate in dollars. Finally, Cambodia (and 
especially Phnom Penh) is "dollarized," meaning that U.S. dollars are preferred as payment over local 
currency (due to its historical weakness and volatility). The prevailing exchange rate among urban markets  
and vendors is 1 U.S. dollar = 4,200 Cambodian riels. 
  
Table 5 : Export Oriented Garments Industry in Cambodia (2003) 
 
Source: Yasar, 2010 
  By Nationality  By Location 
  
 
Number of  
factories 
Number of  
workers employed 
 
 Number of  
factories 
Number of  
workers employed 
Nationality Count % Count % Location Count % Count % 
Taiwan 64 22.86 62761 21.83 Phnom Penh 215 77.0 215820 75.06 
Hong Kong 50 17.86 56918 19.79 Kandal 46 16.3 59778 20.79 
China 37 13.21 22669 7.88 Sihanouk Ville 9 3.2 4090 1.42 
Multinational* 33 11.79 41392 14.40 Kampang Speu 5 1.8 4882 1.70 
South Korea 28 10.00 16289 5.66 Kompang Cham 4 1.4 2321 0.81 
Cambodia 19 6.79 13858 4.82 Svay Rieng 1 0.4 650 0.23 
Malaysia 16 5.71 29337 10.20       
Singapore 9 3.21 21673 7.54       
USA 7 2.50 3017 1.05       
Macau 5 1.79 10791 3.75       
Britain 4 1.43 3977 1.38       
Canada 2 0.71 484 0.17       
Switzerland 1 0.36 85 0.03       
Germany 1 0.36 226 0.08       
Vietnam 1 0.36 670 0.23       
Bangladesh 1 0.36 1676 0.58       
Indonesia 1 0.36 1457 0.51       
Philippines 1 0.36 261 0.09       








Figure 3: The Growth of the Garment Industry in Cambodia, 1995-2005 
(Yasar, 2010) 
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As part of this development, the Cambodian government established a number of 
special export processing zones (EZPs) in which manufacturers could ship materials in 
and finished goods out under preferential tax and tariff guidelines. In addition to being 
located near ports and roads, these EZPs were designed to have quicker and more reliable 
access to both electricity and government administrators, both of which are frequently 
absent throughout large portions of the country. 
Cambodia's rapid increase in – and reliance upon – the garment industry has often 
been referenced as the driving factor behind the country‟s equally aggressive moves to 
integrate globally. Although the sector had grown quickly, the availability of surplus 
labor in other areas, combined with the high mobility of manufacturers, meant that 
factories were at risk of moving elsewhere. While its 1999 admission to ASEAN did little 
to foster trade in garments (with most exports heading to North America, and to a smaller 
degree, Europe (Bargawi, 2005)), it did help to pave the way for Cambodia's successful 
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) on July 22, 2003.  
 As one of only a handful of LDC members, Cambodia was an unorthodox 
candidate for WTO membership. The move was especially risky, given that it would 
require Cambodia to lower tariffs and protections, particularly in the area of 
pharmaceuticals, where it would be forced to honor international patents for HIV/AIDS 
medications. Despite those risks, Secretary of State for Commerce at the time succinctly 
clarified the RGC's motivations: "We have to have WTO accession because the fate of 
220,000 workers is at stake if we don't enter" (Chea et al., 2005).  
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 While that assessment may have been accurate (more than one million rural 
people are fed through remittances from garment industry workers, and another 250,000 
were estimated to be indirectly employed via restaurants, transportation, and other 
services for factory workers (Povarchuk, 2004)), there is also the possibility that it led to 
less comprehensive policy and impact reviews. One participant in the process noted that 
government negotiators rejected any assistance offered by international NGOs and did 
not consult any of the 29 least developed countries who are already WTO members (Chea 
et al., 2005).  
Following entry into the WTO, Cambodia's garment sector continued to grow at a 
rapid rate, providing much-needed jobs and income. However, there have been some 
early difficulties. The rapid expansion of the sector has been one problem in and of itself. 
Garment exports from Cambodia increased so quickly that the U.S. (which absorbs nearly 
75% of all the exports (Chan et al., 2006)) introduced the same kinds of quotas that other 
producer nations faced (Bargawi, 2005). Relief came in the form of rewards for higher 
labor standards and increased workers‟ rights. Public awareness in developed countries to 
the traditionally poor working conditions in garment factories over the past two decades 
have meant that increased labor standards actually give factories a competitive edge. Like 
“CFC free” spray cans, or “dolphin safe” tuna, “fair trade” has become a requirement for 
manufactures who wish to comply with their customers‟ wishes for more responsible 
production.  
Even this has been a mixed bag, however, as the workers‟ rights standards hold 
employers to strict measures about overtime. In a day-to-day sense, it prohibits factories 
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from utilizing any one worker for more than 60 hours per week (Samsen et al.). While 
this measure is laudable in that it seeks to prevent “sweat shop” conditions, it has the 
practical effect of limiting wages available, regardless of demand. At $45-70 per month, 
the average garment worker earns far more than his or her rural counterparts, yet this 
represents a lower sum than is required to improve the standard of living, much less 
support relatives in the country (Samsen et al.; Becker, 2005; 2008). Forbidden from 
working longer hours, Cambodian garment workers have repeatedly threatened work 
stoppages, reducing their competitiveness on the world market (Samsen et al.; Marston, 
2007).  
 Further challenges have come in the form of increased competitiveness from other 
garment manufacturing nations. In 2005, the existing Multi Fibre Agreement that had 
established quotas and limited imports from large producing nations like China and India 
expired. At the time, a number of analysts predicted that the removal of these quotas 
would lead to a large reduction in demand for Cambodian garments, with producers 
choosing to relocate and other areas (Bargawi, 2005; Vuthy et al., 2007). 
 Somewhat surprisingly, garment production in Cambodia continued to grow, with 
exports increasing by 10% in 2006, and the industry employing more than 270,000 
workers in over 250 factories (Vuthy et al., 2007). Much of the credit has been attributed 
to relatively high labor standards within the kingdom, and producers' preference to 
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 While the garment sector proved to be somewhat insulated from foreign 
competition, however, it has been less equipped to overcome decreases in demand from 
North America. In 2009, the Cambodian Garment Manufacturers Association reported 
that over 100 factories had closed around the capital city and that several others were 
reducing their hours and output (Sullivan, 2009). Also as a result of the MFA phase-out 
and shortages of demand, some factories are offering shorter contracts for workers, 
reducing stability in employment (Vuthy et al., 2007). 
Tourism Growth in Cambodia 
The opening of Cambodia's economy has also led to the rise of tourism as a viable 
industry within the country. While not producing nearly as much income as the garment 
industry, the sector grew by an average of 1.5% per year from 1995-2002, and following 
a brief lull, 21% a year from 1998-2000. It now represents roughly 11% of GDP 
(Beresford et al., 2004).  
 There are three main tourist attractions in Cambodia. The lack of urban 
development, combined with dense jungles and an exotic climate, has made it a 
destination for backpacking and outdoor adventure groups. Several major outfitters offer 
guided journeys through the countryside, infusing the local economy with foreign 
                                                 
14
 Additional credit should be given to the RGC for extending tax incentives, although these have been 
viewed in part as an attempt by the government to make up for Cambodia's other manufacturing 
disadvantages, mainly extensive corruption, frequent power outages, poor roads, low technical skills for 
workers and engineers, etc. (Bargawi, 2005). 
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currency. Additionally, the famous temples at Angkor Wat draw thousands of more 
traditional tourists every year. Numerous hotels and restaurants have sprung up around 
Siem Riep catering to foreigners and bringing an influx of dollars, euros, yen and yuan.  
The third group of people estimated to be roughly 22% of all visitors to the 
kingdom (Hach et al., 2002), come to Cambodia because of its active sex trade. It is 
bittersweet that the international attention that fell on Cambodia in the 1990s because of 
its HIV/AIDS crisis bought not only relief agencies, but also sex tourists, some of whom 
arrived after reading or hearing about the high proportion of child prostitutes working in 
the country (Lim, 1998; Kaye Sung Chon, 2003).  
Prostitution in Cambodia 
Prostitution in Cambodia takes several forms. The most common is in brothels, 
where women offer outright sexual services, usually to local residents, for prices ranging 
around $2 (Freed, 2003). The country also has a number of massage parlors, which may 
or may not offer any sort of therapeutic services, where customers frequently offer 
workers payment for sex. And finally, there are a number of hostess bars and karaoke 
bars which serve as de facto places of prostitution, but mainly cater to foreigners (Kim et 
al., 2005). In some cases prostitutes working at hostess bars may be employed by the bar 
owner explicitly for sex work, whereas others work as waitresses or “beer promotion 
girls” (who use prostitution as a way to generate extra income) (Kim et al., 2005), or 
freelance prostitutes who are working for themselves.  
The spread of prostitution in Cambodia has been rapid. At the start of the UNTAC 
mission in 1991, there were an estimated 6,000 sex workers throughout the country, a 
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number that had risen to 20,000 just two years later when the mission ended (Curtis, 
1993). Today, as many as 100,000 women may be involved in sex work in Cambodia, 
although estimates vary greatly, due to the difficulties in measuring a technically-illegal 
activity, as well as the fact that many indirect sex workers do not self-identify themselves 
as such, and despite trading sexual favors for material considerations, may fall outside the 
traditional definition (Steinfatt, 2003). 
 HIV/AIDS rates are much higher among sex workers of all types as compared to 
the Cambodian population in general. HIV Sentinel Surveys of the highest risk groups 
estimated in 2002 that prevalence among direct sex workers was 28.8%, and 14.8% in 
indirect sex workers (Kim et al., 2005). The HIV/AIDS prevalence rate for direct sex 
workers has been decreasing (from 43% to 1998 to 29% in 2002), but the prevalence rate 
for indirect sex workers has not. Two prevalent explanations for this phenomenon are that 
indirect sex workers do not enjoy as much access to preventative measures (i.e., the 
100% condom program) and that they may be more likely to have unprotected encounters 
with men who have semi-exclusive relationships with them (Kim et al., 2005). 
Cambodian prostitutes working in brothels earn the least, averaging $50 per 
month. Those working in massage parlors typically earn a bit more at $70 per month, 
while a girl working in one of the hostess bars might make as much as $100-$150 per 
month or even more (Freed, 2003). In addition to females in prostitution, there is a small 
but active sex trade for homosexual males in Cambodia, and especially Phnom Penh. 
Like their female counterparts, male prostitutes constitute an exceptionally high-risk 
group for HIV/AIDS; however, because their impact on and from the larger economy is 
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much less profound, I have not made them the focus of my discussion. It is interesting to 
note, however, that the main mode of transmission within this community appears to be 
from males having sex with female sex workers and then other men, contrary to trends in 
other parts of the world (Girault et al., 2004). 
Although prostitution is technically illegal in Cambodia, it was largely tolerated 
by the government until 2008, when authorities raided a number of brothels in and 
around Phnom Penh (Cheang, 2008). The move was seen by many as an attempt to 
appease the U.S. government, which rates nations (and trading partners) based on 
trafficking estimations (Busza, 2006; Cheang, 2008). While sex work in the kingdom 
seems to be unaffected as an industry, the increased police pressure on brothels has 
driven much of the practice underground, making prevention campaigns aimed at direct 
sex workers more difficult to execute
15
 (Colley, 2009).  
Linkages between Garments, Tourism, and Sex Work 
 The tandem growth of the two largest export industries in Cambodia and its also-
growing sex trade should not be considered separate phenomena. On the contrary, it is 
important to note that they have distinct ties to one another, and those ties have SDH and 
HIV/AIDS implications.  
 In the case of tourism, the linkages to sex work are relatively straightforward. 
Foreign travel into Cambodia has been steadily rising since 1993, with visitors coming 
for cultural tourism (32%), business in the kingdom (45%), and for sex tourism 
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 In a sad twist of irony, police in Phnom Penh have tried to use condom possession as grounds for 
prostitution arrests (Voice of America, 2008) 
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(Beresford et al., 2004). Although the first 72% may not visit Cambodia for the purpose 
of soliciting sex workers, anecdotal evidence suggests that the high number of informal 
sex workers found at restaurants, hotels, massage parlors, etc., contributes to a crossover 
effect, making legitimate tourism inseparable from the sex industry in Cambodia (Yasar, 
2010). Because the fees paid to informal workers may be as much as 25 times higher than 
those working in brothels, the demand for these activities continues to draw young 
women from the provinces and into establishments where they may meet relatively 
wealthy foreign clients (Kim et al., 2005). 
 In a similar way, the draw of males from rural provinces into EZPs, or urban areas 
of the country where tourism incomes can be generated, creates a similar demand for sex 
work. Migratory labor has long been associated with increases in prostitution in Asia and 
elsewhere (Lim, 1998), as displaced workers may seek out transactional encounters when 
removed from established social networks.  
 The link between garment work in the sex trade is less clear, but probably more 
impactful in Cambodia's fight against HIV/AIDS. Roughly 3,000 females migrate from 
rural provinces into urban areas and EPZs every year (Samsen et al., 2006). Among those 
who make the choice to leave for Phnom Penh or the other production centers, however, 
not all are able to find (or keep) jobs in the garment industry
16
. Factories add and shed 
employees as demand from manufacturers fluctuates. Turnover is also high, and 
employment is insecure. As a result, female workers can frequently find themselves out 
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 Other studies in Africa have found that the prospect of employment and income in urban areas may be 
overstated within rural populations (Tawil et al., 1995)  
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of work and with no means to support themselves, much less their families back at home 
who count on their continued income.  
 Some find employment in other factories, but a high number (perhaps as much as 
80% by some estimates) become sex workers (Çagatay et al., 2001; Nishigaya, 2002; 
Grown, 2005)
17
. Following the layoffs in 2009, many of the laid-off readily admitted to 
reporters that they would be seeking sex work to find new wages, and in fact local media 
reported increases in the number of prostitutes working in the area (Sophon, 2009). 
 This is not as surprising as it would be in other parts of the world. Sex work is one 
of the few options available that doesn't require any sort of formal education or training. 
Additionally, sex work typically pays as much or more than their factory jobs did. A 
survey of prostitutes in Phnom Penh found that the average sex worker earned $50 per 
month, with girls who worked in hostess bars or discos making on average over $100 per 
month – or more than twice the factory minimum (Hor et al., 2005). Sex work, risky as it 
is, may also not be perceived as more difficult or physically demanding. In a survey, 60% 
of garment workers who had been employed in the industry for two years or more 
reported negative health effects from the long hours and poor working conditions 
prevalent in factories (Chan et al., 2006). Additionally, many out-of-employment female 
garment workers who lose their jobs would like to return to rural provinces but are unable 
to because they owe money that was borrowed to pay for travel, lodging, and recruitment 
fees for factoring jobs (Grumiau, 2004). Many also incur relatively high costs to secure 
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 As high as that number may seem, my own informal interviews suggested even higher figures, where 
more than 95% of informal sex workers in Phnom Penh expressed an initial desire to find employment in 
garments.  
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jobs in the garment industry, such as sewing school and unpaid periods of "trial 
employment" (Samsen et al., 2006). There is also evidence that some garment workers 
will engage in informal sex work as a way to earn extra money (Nishigaya, 2002; Webber 
et al., 2010). 
Once they've entered the sex work industry, most find it very difficult to leave. 
The constant flow of young women from the provinces to the cities ensures that 
competition for garment jobs remains stiff, and at a lower wage than they earn in 
prostitution. Perhaps more importantly, the social stigma attached to sex work means that 
most factory employers will be unwilling to hire them. In this way, the entry into sex 
work becomes a dead-end (Stolzberg, 2005). 
Cambodia's Economy Today 
 While modern industry has come to Cambodia's few urban areas, agriculture, 
mainly of rice, is still the predominant industry, employing 70% of all Cambodians 
(Beresford et al., 2004). It should be noted, however, that much of the "income" that is 
derived from these activities is focused on subsistence, and thus generates little or no 
disposable income for households. 
Nearly all exports and foreign income in the formal sector arrive as a product of 
the garment industry, and to a lesser extent, tourism
18
. Through the growth of the garment 
industry, and the liberalization of its economy, Cambodia has placed an increasing 
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 Cambodia has achieved positive growth in a few other areas as well, most notably construction, 
communications, and services (Beresford et al., 2004). But because these are, to greater or lesser degrees, 
dependent on the foreign income that comes from Western agencies and NGO's operating in Cambodia, the 
garment industry, tourism (and likely the sex trade to a lesser extent), they have a smaller impact on (and 
from) the social determinants of health.  
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amount of weight on direct investment and wages stemming from specific sectors in 
tightly defined geographic areas. 
In a sense, the growth of these industries and urban areas represents a solid step 
forward for a country that had very little in terms of resources and development at the end 
of the Civil War. On the other hand, from social determinants of health perspective, 
growth and rapid liberalization have not done much to improve the position of the 
nation's poor. Despite the fact that thousands of Cambodians are relocating to cities every 
year, in search of higher wages and more opportunities, income disparities are continuing 
to rise and at a time when future growth is dangerously dependent on a set of tightly 
clustered industries and geographic areas. 
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Chapter V: Social Determinants of HIV/AIDS in Cambodia 
 
Just as the different social determinants of health can vary and become intensified 
for a single disease, so too can they become more specific for that disease within a 
country or region. In this chapter, we will examine the Cambodian situation through an 
SDH lens, especially with regard to the recent and ongoing structural changes discussed 
in Chapter Four, and their potential impact on HIV/AIDS in the future. 
Recall that the main determinants of HIV/AIDS, at the national level, include 
income, disparities in wealth, urbanization, inequalities in gender rights, and access to 
health care.  
Income and Inequality in Cambodia 
 Even as a poor nation, Cambodia has very poor average citizens. Per capita 
income is $542, nationally, and even that figure paints an optimistic figure, as more than 
50% of all residents earn less than $1 per day, especially in rural areas (Beresford et al., 
2004).  
It's interesting, although not unusual in LDCs, to note that even in the midst of 
such pervasive poverty, income disparity is very high (Cambodia's Gini index number is 
40), with the top 20% of earners claiming nearly half of all wealth. Economic growth in 
Cambodia has not produced any significant poverty reduction; if anything, income 
 74 
inequality is growing (Beresford et al., 2004) Beyond subsistence level wage jobs, the 
poor have been relatively unaffected by growth (Samsen et al.; Beresford et al., 2004). 
One of the reasons is that they had so little capital and expertise to start with. Even in the 
expanding garment industry, more than 90% of factories are owned by foreigners 
(Bargawi, 2005), and most of those prefer to bring in managers and technical experts 
from their own countries (Chan et al., 2006), meaning that the lion's share of factory 
profits, along with the best salaries, represent capital outflows. 
 Low access to health care by the poor may also be another factor contributing to 
new gaps in wealth. Given that more than two-thirds of the country relies on agriculture 
for income and nutritional intake, landlessness is a strong indicator of poverty in 
Cambodia. One study showed that 10% of Cambodia's land changed hands in a five-year 
period beginning in 1998 (Beresford et al., 2004), with the wealthy being net buyers and 
the poor being net sellers. The sale of agricultural land often follows a major health crisis, 
as many of the rural poor cannot afford doctor's fees and medications. 
 The combination of extensive poverty and high income and wealth disparity, 
especially between the rural and urban areas, is important to note because it has heavy 
implications for the country's SDH outlook when it comes to HIV/AIDS. Unlike in many 
other countries, with similarly high disparities, Cambodia has not only a population of 
underprivileged individuals trying to claim a larger slice of national wealth, but a high 
number of men, women, and children trying to meet basic necessities like food and water. 
All the while they are surrounded by (relatively) wealthier Cambodians, and tens of 
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thousands of foreigners who enjoy an income level and standard of living that are far 
beyond anything they know.  
 This contrast between those that are in possession of wealth and those that aren't 
creates powerful incentives for migration, social change, and even "high risk" behavior 
like sex work among the poorest half of the country. It has been shown for some time that 
globalization and liberalization tend to be "asymmetrical" phenomena – bringing far more 
benefit to those who already have capital, both across borders and within individual 
nations and communities (Birdsall, 2006). That observation seems consistent with 
Cambodia's case, where the liberalization of the economy is fueling both greater income 
disparities between the rich and poor, and an ever-increasing trend of urbanization
19
 to 
the capital and main export zones.  
Social Cohesion in Cambodia 
Their recent history of civil war and governmental change has left the Cambodian 
population socially fractured and disorganized (Chandler, 1996). Many of the older 
generations who might have passed on or enforced previous cultural ideas didn't survive 
the civil conflict, which ended less than three decades ago and still casts a long shadow 
on Cambodian society
20
. Governmental participation also suffers, at the local and 
national levels, both from apathy and fear of opposing existing regimes (Curtis, 1993).  
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 The proportion of Cambodians living in an urban area is expected to have doubled from 2015 levels by 
2015 (World Bank, 2005) 
20
 It is interesting that one study linked colonial legacy as a social determinant of HIV/AIDS (Holmqvist, 
2009), by means of disrupting social norms, encouraging migration, and creating greater imbalances in 
income, status, and wealth. While Cambodia's colonial ties to France are probably not strong enough to put 
it in such a category, the same effects could be said to result from their recent civil war. 
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Likewise, the rise of the tourism and other export-related industries has meant that 
nearly every new job created by liberalization and direct foreign investment has been in 
one of the urban areas of Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville, and Battambang (Bargawi, 2005). 
The trend that began with the UNTAC mission continues, exaggerating the income 
disparities between urban and rural citizens, and funneling money to those at the top 
(Curtis, 1993; Beresford et al., 2004). This in turn helps to fuel the steady migration from 
the provinces into urban areas, and especially EZPs, disrupting established social norms, 
taking men and women away from their social and sexual networks, and leading to higher 
incidences of drug abuse and other urban phenomena that bode poorly for the country's 
fight against HIV/AIDS from a social determinants of health perspective. 
Women's Rights in Cambodia 
 There is no strong history of women's rights in Cambodia. Social traditions dictate 
that "good girls" stay home with their families, get married, and raise children. Those 
who leave home, on the other hand, are considered tainted for having stepped outside of 
the established gender roles (Gorman et al., 1999). 
 The patriarchal nature of Cambodia society leads to an emphasis on educating 
boys, often at the expense of their sisters (Gorman et al., 1999). It is not uncommon for 
the girls in a household to leave school after only two or three years of primary school to 
work with their mothers in the home, and only 22% of Cambodian women are 
functionally literate (Beresford et al., 2004). This lack of any formal education puts them 
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at a severe disadvantage for the small amount of skilled employment available, even 
above and beyond the social attitudes that exist about women. 
 The current program of liberalization in Cambodia, and the rising importance of 
the garment industry, has increased participation by women in the formal economy
21
, but 
has not as of yet positively impacted their social positioning.  
Rice farming, Cambodia's predominant occupation, especially in the rural 
provinces may in certain years fail to generate income to sustain households, much less 
provide for savings and investment. In fact, many village families are unable to produce 
enough to even feed themselves, much less support sick relatives or invest in agricultural 
equipment, so there are few employment opportunities available in these areas (Beresford 
et al., 2004). Moreover, the handful of jobs (in this case opportunities to farm the family's 
land) traditionally go to sons. As such, there aren't always jobs available for young girls 
in the provinces in which they were raised. And so, unless a girl happens to be married in 
her village at a very young age, her best current option is typically to move to an urban 
area and look for employment. This presents an interesting dilemma, as the choice that is 
most economically viable for the individual also lowers her social positioning within her 
community.  
And so, the 250,000 women who work in Cambodia's garment factories (90% of 
whom come from rural areas (Chan et al., 2006)) represent something of an enigma, 
being both the engine of Cambodia's export growth on the one hand and something of a 
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 With 82% of working age females employed, mostly through agriculture, garments, or services, 
Cambodia has the highest percentage of working women in Asia (Beresford et al., 2004) 
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social discomfort on the other. The female workers in the garment industry don't just 
boost the country's trade balance figures; they subsidize and support nearly everyone else. 
Of the average $72 wage earned (comprised of a $45 minimum plus overtime (Chan et 
al., 2006)), an estimated half of earnings is used for food, shelter, and other basic 
amenities, while as much as half is used to support family in the countryside (Chan et al., 
2006). With more than 90% of garment workers sending money back to the provinces, 
more than 1.7 million people are dependent, directly or indirectly, on the garment export 
industry (Samsen et al.). A portion of those funds may even allow for investment in 
agriculture, particularly in equipment and fertilizer (Chan et al., 2006). Moreover, 
because of the large number of small businesses and industries that exist to support 
garment workers, a 2006 study by the Economic Institute of Cambodia estimated that 
every $100 generated by garments resulted in $205 in new demand within the kingdom 
(Samsen et al.).  
Traditional Cambodian gender roles dictate that the young females who move 
away from their villages are considered undesirable, while at the same time, much of the 
country is at least somewhat dependent on their income. The result is a dynamic where 
young girls are compelled to leave their homes and go to work, but aren't free to return 
and join the social networks they left behind; they are needed by their families and 
villages, but not respected within them
22
. In one survey, 45% of garment workers 
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 This same stigma is not applied to males, who often migrate to urban areas at high rates. In fact, SDH 
gender studies have shown that men returning home from migrant work may enter rural villages with 
increased disposable income, and may seek sex from several concurrent partners (potential wives) because 
of unequal power arrangements (Collins et al., 2000). 
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expressed a wish to return to their native province and engage in agricultural work, an 
option that may not be viable because of existing debts, social stigmas, and family 
obligations (Grumiau, 2004; Chan et al., 2006; Samsen et al., 2006).  
Gender norms in Cambodia are not changing as quickly as the economic policies 
which are impacting them. As with the disparities in income, the current structural shifts 
in the Cambodian economy may be further marginalizing several groups, especially 
women, lowering their social position and placing them at higher risk for disease. 
Access to Health Care in Cambodia 
 While healthcare service is generally becoming more available to Cambodian 
residents, utilization of doctors and hospitals remains low. In 2009, only one out of every 
40 Cambodians living in an urban area had been to see the medical provider, a figure that 
dropped to one out of every 100 in the rural provinces (Jacobs et al., 2004). 
 One of the key features of Cambodia's ongoing reform has been the privatization 
of several sectors, including health care (Bhushan et al., 2006). As a staple of most 
neoliberal programs, this feature should not be surprising (Kapur et al., 2000; Kim et al., 
2000). User fees have been introduced at hospitals and medical centers as a way to 
increase revenue for ongoing treatment programs, raise the standard of care, and 
formalize payments for services, which have been historically been offered "under the 
table" to government employees (Hardeman et al., 2004; Jacobs et al., 2004)
23
. 
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 In fact, many government employees point to the possibility of additional incomes as their reason for 
choosing these positions (Beresford et al., 2004). 
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 Although there have been some increased efficiencies through the implementation 
of user fees along with "equity funds" that help the poor to afford treatment (Hardeman et 
al., 2004), the net effect has been a decrease in health services availability for the poor. 
At an average of $3.2 per appointment (Jacobs et al., 2004), most Cambodians find 
doctor visits and medicines an unattainable luxury. Hence, they either skip visiting the 
doctor altogether or wait until their medical situation has deteriorated to the point where 
no other options exist (Beresford et al., 2004), which further increases the risk of 
previously mentioned medical poverty traps. This truth has been acknowledged even by 
the proponents of the user fee health system. In 1992, a World Bank report stated that 
"the fact that most public sector services now are provided on a fee-for-service basis 
disenfranchises the poorest segment of the Cambodian population and also endangers the 
long-term financial sustainability of the country's public sector social services" (Curtis, 
1993). 
 The decrease in public health expenditures and availability has meant fewer 
screenings and treatments for virtually every ailment that affects the poor. As a result, 
Cambodians face increased infant mortality, malaria and tuberculosis rates, and a shorter 
life expectancy that stems from the failure to recognize and treat diseases early on 
(Jacobs et al., 2004).  
 This low rate of medical care affects the social determinants of HIV/AIDS in 
Cambodia in a number of ways. In the most direct sense, of course, it prevents healthcare 
providers from diagnosing illness effectively, treating symptoms, and educating the 
public about care and prevention. These are important first steps, as identifying patients 
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who are HIV positive before they spread the disease to spouses and unborn children 
could help stop one of the most prevalent chains of infection.  
Even when HIV/AIDS is properly diagnosed in Cambodia, liberalization means 
that infected persons are less likely to have access to life-saving medication. Adherence 
to Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which forced 
Cambodia to acknowledge and enforce patents of large pharmaceutical companies, was a 
necessary component in Cambodia‟s accession to the WTO.  
ARTs, which reduce the amount of diseased cells in the bloodstream, potentially 
prolong an HIV positive patient's life by decades and may greatly decrease their chances 
of infecting another person, are currently patented and thus covered by TRIPS protection. 
In the developed world, ARTs cost $10,000-12,000 per year, using patented drug 
treatments, generally “cocktails” that contain three or four medications used in tandem to 
fight a particular strain, and customized for a patient‟s age, physical well-being, viral 
load, and so on (Coriat et al., 2006). Even though preferential pricing programs exist for 
LDCs, they have traditionally been unable to compete with generic alternatives 
manufactured in India. A three-drug cocktail produced in India, for example, costs less 
than $350 per year (Frontières, 2005; Coriat et al., 2006). 
 In fact, generics have not only been cheaper, but in some cases made simpler for 
patients, as well. For instance, one Indian manufacturer combined three drugs that make a 
common antiretroviral cocktail into a single pill (Frontières, 2005). This may seem to add 
only a small amount of practical value in the developed world, but in LDCs, where the 
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majority of the population might lack access to running water or accurate clocks with 
which to schedule their multiple doses, these improvements have been significant. 
 Beginning in 2016, Cambodia will not be legally able import these discounted 
generic ARVs. This may leave patients in one of the world's poorest countries in a 
precarious position: They cannot afford the crucial antiretroviral medications that could 
save their lives, but face slim odds of survival without them. 
 Despite the 100% condom and clean needle programs, HIV/AIDS prevention 
remains a problem because so many of Cambodia‟s infected are unaware of their HIV 
positive status (Senya et al., 2003). By removing medical professionals from the 
equation, privatization and the introduction of user fees is encouraging that trend is likely 
to continue. Additionally, the presence of other untreated STDs greatly increases the risk 
of contracting HIV/AIDS, another role that doctors play in stemming the tide of new 
infections. For those reasons, the current liberalization of Cambodia has to be considered 
a poor sign from a social determinants of health perspective.  
The Social Determinants of HIV/AIDS in Cambodia: A High-Risk 
Situation 
 Having examined the social determinants of HIV/AIDS in Cambodia – and the 
ongoing effect of neoliberal policy shifts on those determinants – an overall picture 
begins to arise, one that shows a country that is both increasingly susceptible and 
vulnerable to another HIV/AIDS pandemic (Figure 4). 
 Liberal economic and trade policies are exaggerating income disparities between 
the highest and lowest earners in Cambodian society (Beresford et al., 2004). Those in 
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urban areas are able take advantage of the influx of foreign capital by securing relatively 
higher wages than their rural counterparts, which in turn is helping to accelerate the flow 
of men and women leaving the provinces and heading into cities, and especially EZPs 
(Samsen et al., 2006). The rapid increase in urbanization has been tied to changing sexual 
and drug abuse patterns among the working poor, and especially a higher incidence of 
prostitution (Nishigaya, 2002). 
 Each of these shifts changes the dynamics of HIV/AIDS transmission, and they 
all negatively affect the SDH of HIV/AIDS situation (Barnett et al., 2000; Collins et al., 
2000; Barnett et al., 2002; Barnett, 2004). As long as young, uneducated females are 
compelled to leave their homes and flock to urban areas, the potential for entry into sex 
work will exist. This is particularly true in an environment where incomes are low and 
unpredictable, and the presence of a large, wealthier (to a smaller, lesser degree) male 
population of foreign visitors and migratory workers also exists. 
  
 
Figure 4 : SDH of HIV Cambodia 





 Prostitution has been steadily increasing as a component of Cambodia's informal 
economy since 1991, and its growth has mirrored the gains seen in tourism and garment 
production (Beresford et al., 2004). Given that neoliberal and export-oriented policies are 
firmly established in place, there is little reason to expect this trend will abate in the near 
future. More likely is that it will accelerate, based on the fact that garment industry jobs 
can be relocated quickly and with few costs in the event that cheaper labor becomes 
available elsewhere, or global demand for textiles decreases appreciably (Bargawi, 2005; 
Chan et al., 2006). 
 Sex work, regardless of whether it's formal or not, remains a "high risk" activity 
for HIV/AIDS, not to mention a host of other STIs, medical ailments, and psychosocial 
difficulties (Hor et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2005; Sopheab et al., 2008). However, in an 
environment where it offers higher incomes than other available jobs and can be the only 
option for supporting one's self or family members in the provinces, it becomes a 
perfectly rational economic decision (Holmqvist, 2009). Again, we are reminded that 
behavior, far from being a result of individual motivations, is largely determined by 
prevailing social and economic environment that an individual is faced with (Diderichsen 
et al., 2001). 
 Despite government pressure, it seems unlikely that the established pathways 
between tourism, garment work, and the sex industry will go away. Based on recent and 
anecdotal experience, a focus on programs that aim to further penalize sex workers 
through legal means should be expected to result in even greater numbers of indirect sex 
workers (Busza, 2006; Kunthear, 2010 ) who are more difficult to reach through 
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established micro-medical HIV/AIDS prevention measures (Rojanapithayakorn, 2006; 
Sopheab et al., 2008), such as the 100% condom campaign, which is targeted exclusively 
to direct sex workers in brothels (World Health Organization, 2001; Kim et al., 2005). 
With or without interference from police, however, the size and scope of sex work in 
Cambodia's urban areas and EZPs should be expected to continue as long as garments 
and tourism remain growth industries. Accordingly, a rise in the aggregate STI and 
HIV/AIDS incidence could logically follow – regardless of whether prevalence rates 
improve, which is contraindicated from existing surveys (Sopheab et al., 2008; Couture et 
al., 2011). 
 Indeed, the presence of more prostitutes may, in another itself, create greater 
HIV/AIDS risks for Cambodia's existing population of sex workers. In the past, low 
bargaining power and increasing numbers of prostitutes, and some cases even 
competition from other prostitutes in neighboring countries
24
 have led Cambodian sex 
workers to agree to unsafe sexual practices in order to secure income (Sopheab et al., 
2003; Gazin et al., 2006; Couture et al., 2011). Afraid to lose the valuable currency that 
comes with a paying customer, 80% of the prostitutes in one survey have reported 
agreeing to unprotected encounters with customers (Wong et al., 2003). 
 Given that one of the most prominent modes of HIV/AIDS transmission in 
Cambodia is from female sex workers to their male clients, who in turn spread the disease 
to wives and unborn children (Bith, 2004; Hor et al., 2005; UNAIDS, 2010), a resurgence 
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 There is some anecdotal evidence that sex tourists visiting Thailand enter Cambodia for the prospect of 
unprotected sex with prostitutes. In this way, paradoxically, the success of the 100% condom program in 
Thailand actually hurts Cambodia‟s HIV/AIDS effort, since the prostitutes working in Phnom Penh have 
less education and more competition, causing them to more readily accept their clients‟ terms. 
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of HIV/AIDS in Cambodia remains a distinct possibility, especially among the rural 
uneducated. At the same time, the proliferation of neoliberal policies – including the 
privatization of health care and adherence to TRIPS provisions – means that fewer 
treatment options may exist for Cambodia's poor in the near future
25
. The fact that so 
many households could quickly lose their primary income through wages, or land sold in 
the event of a medical poverty trap, necessitates the assessment that the kingdom has 
been made particularly vulnerable to the effects of another HIV/AIDS pandemic as well. 
The incentives created by a liberalized economy in Cambodia actively encourage 
HIV/AIDS transmission by the most socially and economically underprivileged. Ongoing 
structural shifts are further marginalizing millions, especially females and the migratory 
poor, lowering their social position to the point where "high risk" behaviors become 
economically rational. This greatly increases Cambodia's susceptibility to HIV/AIDS at 
all levels of society, while is simultaneously made more vulnerable by the reliance on a 
few labor-intensive industries and the removal of health care as a public good.  
While certain aspects of the ongoing liberalizing changes may be helping the 
country's balance sheet, from a social determinants of health perspective, they add up to 
what can only be considered a very high-risk situation. 
                                                 
25
 In the short term, availability of ART medications in Cambodia has actually been improving; however, 
this is largely the result of UN interventions and NGO donations. Future funding and availability remain 
unclear (UNAIDS, 2010). 
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Chapter VI: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In comparing the available data about HIV/AIDS in Cambodia with the picture 
painted by SDH determinants, we arrive at two opposing views: On the one hand, new 
infections have inarguably decreased, and on the other, an examination of the underlying 
indicators of risk for increased incidences of HIV/AIDS shows that the situation could 
potentially be expected to worsen, not improve. So is Cambodia really the HIV/AIDS 
success story that so many consider it to be? 
 The early success of micro-medical interventions should not be diminished or 
unappreciated by this question. Thousands of lives have undoubtedly been saved by 
programs that strive for 100% condom use among sex workers and clean needle 
exchanges. The issue at hand is not whether these interventions have been necessary, but 
whether they could have been made more effective through attention to the underlying 
social determinants of HIV/AIDS, and whether they can continue to work so effectively 
in the future without further intervention. 
To find an accurate answer to that question, it makes sense to begin by taking a 
closer look at the reported numbers themselves. While the infection rate of HIV/AIDS in 
Cambodia has certainly decreased, the matter of how much is less clear. With no internal 
government, and fewer than twenty doctors in the country at the close of the nation's civil 
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war in 1993 (Fraser, 2005), Cambodia, like many LDCs, has long suffered from 
inaccurate medical record-keeping. It has been noted by many that even births and deaths 
in rural areas of LDCs are not tallied correctly (Attaran, 2005), and few countries suffer 
from such poor information as Cambodia. All figures attached to HIV/AIDS prevalence 
within the kingdom – from the highest to lowest – represent good estimates at best, 
educated guesses at worst. In fact, UNAIDS has been forced to revise its own estimates 
of the Cambodian epidemic several times (UNAIDS, 2010). Some of these revisions in 
estimates of the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate can be traced to new information; others to 
changes in the models from which the figures were derived. There has never been a 
national screening for HIV/AIDS, or any other disease, in Cambodia so it's simply not 
known whether the epidemic was ever as statistically severe as has been reported, or if it 
has improved as much as the newer numbers suggest. 
Adding to the difficulty is the possibility that Cambodia's HIV/AIDS rate remains 
somewhat artificially low. This is due to the fact that, without access to antiretroviral 
medication or other forms of treatment common in the Western world, a Cambodian who 
contracted HIV/AIDS in the first years when prevalence rates were higher had a very 
short life expectancy, only a few years at best. Therefore, after the initial "burst" of 
infections, it's possible that many suffering from the disease died out, leaving a lower 
overall prevalence rate, but the same potential for future difficulties (Page-Shafer et al.; 
Charles, 2006). 
Regardless of whether past and current models prove to be accurate, however, 
there are troubling signs that another wave of infections remains a possibility. From a 
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social determinants perspective, indications would have to be that the current 
liberalization of the country's economy is aggravating a set of conditions that is 
somewhat similar to those that preceded the widespread HIV/AIDs infections seen in the 
first few years after the disease was introduced to the country. With the heavy gears of 
political and economic motion having been set in motion nearly two decades ago, and 
with billions of dollars worth of international support and enthusiasm behind them, it 
seems unlikely that the trends of urbanization, liberalization, and a reliance on foreign 
investment are going to abate in the near future. However, it is these very same dynamics 
that suggest Cambodia could be perched on the edge of another HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
rather than gracefully exiting the last one. 
Shortcomings of Neoliberalism and the Micro-Medical Approach 
 Having summarized the ways in which neoliberal policies are deteriorating 
Cambodia's social determinants of HIV/AIDS stance, it is unnecessary to rehash them 
exhaustively at this point. What should be highlighted, however, is that the growing gaps 
in equity and social position have not been unrecognized side effects, even by those who 
are most in favor of the liberal policies in question.  
 Even the World Bank admits that increased inequality in countries accounting for 
86% of the world's developing population should expect to suffer loss of status, power, 
and personal security through 2030, with the "unskilled poor" being left even further 
behind than they are now (World Bank, 2007). Modern manufacturing techniques allow 
for unprecedented movement between countries and regions, with few transition costs 
(Nickell et al., 1995). The result is a system where unskilled labor will trend toward 
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countries with the lowest production costs, perhaps translating into lower standards of 
living, least amount of workers' rights, and highest gaps in social positioning between 
those at the top of the societies and those of the bottom. In that context, the lessons and 
observations they can come from judging Cambodia's HIV/AIDS success in a new 
perspective could carry important implications for other liberalizing economies going 
forward. 
 Beneath the juxtaposition of the social determinants of health and the recognized 
statistical success of micro-medical measures (regardless of the confidence we may have 
in those figures), lie smaller, more concrete sets of indicators that may demonstrate that 
socioeconomic factors could have the potential to overwhelm existing preventative 
interventions. 
 One such indicator is the noted rise in HIV incidence – and corresponding failure 
of 100% condom campaigns – in both direct and indirect sex workers. Although the 
100% condom campaign has been called a success and supported by both public and 
private sources, there has been no appreciable decline in overall STIs amongst sex 
workers, (Sopheab et al., 2008) and HIV/AIDs rates, while lowering, still sit at nearly 
29%. 
 Three good arguments have been provided to explain this discrepancy in the 
existing literature. The first is that high turnover in brothels makes the spreading of 
information difficult, so gains in 100% condom compliance are sometimes lost when new 
sex workers migrate in and out of areas frequently (Sopheab et al., 2008). Another is that 
police intervention has made it more difficult to manage programs aimed exclusively at 
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sex workers, forcing them to do business more confidentially (Sopheab et al., 2008). And 
a third points out that indirect sex workers, who make up an increasingly large portion of 
Cambodia's sex trade, are less impacted by these programs and are also more likely to 
engage in unprotected sex with "sweethearts," "boyfriends" and other regular partners. 
 Each of these probably contributes to the persistently high incidence of 
HIV/AIDS and other STIs among sex workers in Cambodia, but they may also obscure a 
bigger truth already recognized in SDH literature: HIV/AIDS policies that focus only on 
behavior modification are likely to fail (Stillwaggon, 2002). As long as the conditions 
which drive individual and so-called "high risk" behavior exist, then stemming the tide of 
new infections is necessarily going to be a run against the wind at best and a losing battle 
at worst. If we accept that much of our behavior is socially determined, then the 
difference between high-risk behaviors and high-risk situations – and the inefficiency of 
remedying one and not the other – becomes strikingly clear. 
 Despite concentrated attempts to enforce 100% condom use among the population 
most at risk for contracting HIV/AIDS, consistent condom use was reported by only 80% 
of formal sex workers, and only 38% used condoms with casual partners. Sixty-seven 
percent reported having been forced or convinced by a client not to use a condom in the 
past week (Sopheab et al., 2008). From a medical standpoint, taking the risk of 
contracting a terminal, incurable disease for a daily wage makes no sense. Within the 
context of the life of a marginalized migrant worker in Cambodia, however, it is not 
irrational. That's especially true when you consider that most have very low bargaining 
power and value the present income far more than future worries that may or may not 
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ever arrive (Wojcicki et al., 2001). In other words, the threat of HIV infection is remote, 
but survival of one's self or the dependent family back in the province is an immediate 
and pressing concern, and the threat of poverty is stronger than the threat of AIDS 
(Collins et al., 2000; Holmqvist, 2009). 
 Changing behavior on the individual level is always a tricky proposition, even in 
the industrial world. Studies have shown empirically that concentrated attempts to alter 
negative health behaviors like smoking and drinking have shown poor results 
(Freudenberg, 1987). If a committed team of professionals in the United States has been 
unable to alter expensive, socially unwelcome habits in men and women with many years 
of life expectancy ahead of them, what sort of hopes can we pin on programs that can 
potentially remove income from those who are living just above the level of starvation? 
As Zwi notes, "Conventional health education is likely to fail in high-risk settings" (Zwi 
et al., 1991). 
 If behavior modification was itself powerful enough in such settings, then it is 
possible that the number of sex workers would not be increasing in Cambodia in the first 
place. However, in impoverished communities with low social position, the decision to 
enter sex work has been demonstrated as a perfectly rational option (Collins et al., 2000). 
 If we accept that micro-medical measures may not be sufficient to stop the flow of 
new infections or will never be able to reach high enough compliance within "high-risk 
populations" to entirely contain HIV/AIDS to those communities, then the recognized 
secondary chains of transmission gained new importance. Recalling that one of the most 
prevalent means of HIV/AIDS infection in Cambodia is from female sex workers to their 
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male clients, and that almost half of all new HIV infections in the kingdom are among 
married women (Webber et al., 2010), then the implicit dangers of trying to prevent 
spread of disease at a single point are exposed.  
 It may have taken a single person to spread HIV/AIDS from Haiti to the United 
States, and a small network of individuals with low information engaging in "high-risk 
behavior" to spread it all over the world. With its rapid growth, urbanization, and 
breakdown of social norms, could the same not happen in Cambodia, where few micro-
medical safeguards are in place to inform and protect the rural poor? 
 A recent UNAIDS report warns about increasing risks of a resurgence of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic in Cambodia, highlighting the persistent infection rates and sex 
workers and the spread of the disease from married men to their wives and unborn 
children in the provinces (UNAIDS, 2010). Although it calls for an increase in funding 
and more adherents to micro-medical campaigns, it is possible that these tactics don't 
have the power to stop new infections at their most important sources. 
Liberalization and Health: The Intersection of Competing Interests 
 An interesting parallel exists between the early, micro-medical efforts to fight 
HIV/AIDS in Cambodia and the steps taken to incite economic growth in a country with 
a limited base of resources and technical expertise. Specifically, the neoliberal policies 
which have been instituted, largely at the advice of foreign advisors, could almost be seen 
as a "micro medical" approach to poverty reduction. Just as condoms and clean needles 
have prevented infections without removing incentives for high-risk behavior, liberal 
economic policies have been successful in so far as they have been able to create new 
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jobs, instill growing industries in the country, and raise GDP by an average of 6% over 
the past ten years, while still not doing much to alleviate the misery of the country's poor 
(Beresford et al., 2004).  
The question is not whether Cambodia‟s leadership or stakeholders want better 
health – fighting HIV/AIDS and generally improving the social safety net could only 
strengthen the kingdom and its economic base. The issue, rather, is whether they are 
willing to put matters of public health and social health interests over other concerns, 
namely a commitment to neoliberal polices that negatively affect the social determinants 
of health, and especially HIV/AIDS. If we are to use the history of their actions as a base, 
we can only come to the conclusion that they are not.  
 Fighting infectious diseases in the developing world is an often-stated goal. In 
fact, the United Nations, which remains one of the most visible and enduring presences in 
the Cambodian capital years after the UNTAC mission ended, has publicly stated its 
desire to be guided by the Millennium Development Goals – a set of social and economic 
targets put forth to steer aid in the most important directions. Among these, a subset of 
which are specific to Cambodia, a decline in HIV/AIDS and a reduction in poverty are 
explicitly named. And yet, while this project remains underfunded and mired in 
disagreements over its scope and metrics (Attaran, 2005; Sachs, 2005), the liberalization 
program continues unopposed, with fast-tracked WTO admission and sweeping reforms 
implemented quickly.  
 It isn‟t that these tracks are simply competing, but that they seem to be at odds 
with one another. In their report on the social determinants of health, a United Nations 
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committee (Marmot et al 2008) concluded that, in order to close the gap between those 
with the best worldwide health outcomes in those with the worst, it would be advisable to 
improve the daily conditions in many areas by: 
 Increasing permanent employment (rather than temporary working arrangements)  
 Establishing universal health care where health protection does not exist 
 Decreasing and equitable distributions money and power 
 Increasing gender equality 
 Reversing the trend of commercialization and health care 
 There are, of course, other recommendations in the study, but these are the 
overarching goals that could be considered most critical to achieving positive outcomes 
from a social determinants of health viewpoint. In almost every case, the move toward a 
more liberalized Cambodian economy  has undermined these stated efforts by shifting 
labor to temporary and transitional employment (especially in the garment factories and 
export zones), commercializing and decreasing the availability of health care,  all while 
further marginalizing women and others with lower social position.  
 Given that both the United Nations‟ goals and the liberalizing economic policies 
that have come to Cambodia have been largely imagined and encouraged by outside 
advisors, it is easy to see that much of the world is of two minds when it comes to finding 
the appropriate course of action for nations struggling to join the modern world. When it 
comes to achieving changes in policy, however, it is clear that economic growth through 
liberalization has been the higher priority. 
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Policy Recommendations 
 To balance the benefits of export and GDPpc growth against the potential of 
another HIV/AIDS pandemic in the future, there are a number of policy shifts that could 
be pursued by the major stakeholders in Cambodia. While any change to the country's 
current socioeconomic structure carries the potential for even more unintended side 
effects, these are seven tools that could improve Cambodia's HIV/AIDS position from an 
SDH standpoint. 
1. Enact a reduction in user fees for the poor 
2. Change taxation patterns to achieve more equitable income distribution 
3. Promote stronger gender rights 
4. Create a stronger social safety net for the sick 
5. Apply for compulsory licenses or negotiate better ART coverage 
6. Promote workers‟ rights in other parts of the world 
7. Continue and expand current micro-medical measures 
Enact a reduction in user fees for the poor 
 For many Cambodians, health care (and especially preventative treatments) is a 
luxury that remains beyond their means. That means that unless an illness is particularly 
severe, it remains undiagnosed and untreated, leaving the individual less productive and 
more prone to other opportunistic infections. 
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 In one study, user fees were reduced or eliminated for the poorest residents
26
 of a 
rural Cambodian province (Hardeman et al., 2004). The result was increased efficiency, 
better patient care, and fewer medical poverty traps. Although this system was funded 
from external, non-governmental donors, a similar program could conceivably be put into 
place by raising user fees for other segments of the population. 
Change taxation patterns to achieve more equitable income distribution 
 Although redistributive policies are generally at odds with neoliberal philosophy, 
there is some evidence that suggests they may be helpful in creating more equitable 
health outcomes (Wilkinson, 2006). The poorest men and women in every country 
experience higher mortality rates, lower social positioning, higher incidence of disease, 
and generally worse health; conversely, the most egalitarian societies will enjoy better 
health and higher LEB throughout all social positions (Wilkinson, 1996). 
 Those observations would seem to be strong indicators that reducing inequity 
could be a way to increase health in nearly any country, but in Cambodia there is the 
potential for them to be particularly effective, given that those with the lowest social 
position have so many incentives for "high risk" behavior, and so few reasons to avoid 
them. In one study, it was shown the Latin American nations were able to reduce poverty 
through redistributive policies that amounted to the equivalent of many years of solid 
economic growth (Paes de Barros et al., 2002). Similar shifts in Cambodia, as unpleasant 
                                                 
26
 As part of this program, staff were trained to help identify customers who might not have the ability to 
pay. Since the introduction of user fees, many of the sick in rural Cambodia engage in economically-
hazardous behavior (like selling land or taking out high-interest loans) in order to finance hospital visits 
before they arrive. By noting that some could not afford food and other necessities, coverage was extended 
to those in need beyond those who self-reported. 
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as they may be to policymakers and economic advisors, could conceivably help to 
alleviate some of Cambodia's crushing poverty and improve its chances of stemming of 
another HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
Promote stronger gender rights  
 As quickly as economic growth and change have come to Cambodia, progressive 
attitudes within society have been slower to adjust (Hill et al., 2004). The fact that so 
many Cambodian women are subject to domestic abuse (Nelson et al., 1996), that social 
stigmas are attached to migration for work (Samsen et al., 2006), and that prostitutes are 
regularly attacked and raped by police, young men, and others with higher social position 
without consequence (Jejeebhoy et al., 2005) are all indicators of how far behind females 
really are in Cambodian society. 
 Beyond the societal troubles that may result from these attitudes, they represent a 
key weakness from a SDH of HIV/AIDS point of view. Because of the dependence that 
their families may have on them, many unemployed garment workers and other young 
females turn to sex work out of necessity. Often, they engage in these activities until they 
become older or infected with an STI and return to the rural provinces, often to continue 
sex work and a lower competition environment (Sopheab et al., 2003). Given that 
medical facilities and preventative treatments are not as prevalent outside the urban areas, 
this is one way in which the path of HIV/AIDS transmission can move from traditional 
"high-risk groups" to the greater population at large. 
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 A campaign for stronger women's rights, and especially one that put an emphasis 
on training and education for young women looking to transition away from sex work, 
could help break some of the most damaging links in this process. By offering more job 
skills, and decreasing the social stigma attached to working women – in the sex trade and 
otherwise – Cambodia could raise their social position and potentially decrease both 
susceptibility and vulnerability to HIV/AIDS. If long economic traditions can change so 
quickly in Cambodia, then it's possible that, with a focused effort, social and gender 
patterns could as well. 
Create a stronger social safety net for the sick 
 Medical poverty traps exist in many parts of the world, even in wealthy countries 
with high average incomes (Wilkinson, 2006; Labonté et al., 2007; Marmot, 2008). In 
Cambodia, however, the risks are more extreme. One study concluded that that 25% of 
rural residents in the area were at risk of falling into extreme poverty in the event of a 
serious illness (Hardeman et al., 2004). Once these illnesses occur, the sick (or their 
remaining family members) are often even more impoverished than they were before, 
possibly without any land or remaining forms of consistent income. This, in turn, can 
easily lead to migration and higher risk medical behaviors, like sex work. 
 In the same way that equity funds at hospitals and medical centers have the 
potential to increase standards of health care for the poorest, a stronger social safety net 
could prevent relatively common medical maladies from imposing extreme poverty on 
Cambodians. 
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Apply for compulsory licenses or negotiate lower cost ART coverage 
 Globalization and liberalization may bring export benefits to LDCs, but they also 
carry heavy costs. While the kingdom has yet to feel the full effect of adherence to 
TRIPS, it is possible that complying with international patents for  ARTs may severely 
restrict access to life-saving medicines in the future
27
 (Hoen, 2002; Ceukelaire, 2003; 
Coriat et al., 2006). 
 Currently, India is in the process of working through the legalities of the generic 
production of antiretroviral medications (Orsi et al., 2007). Should they prove successful, 
the Cambodian government should apply for a compulsory license to import these 
generic cocktails into the country. Doing so may carry the risk of making the nation seem 
less "business friendly," but the potential economic and social effects of a strong 
HIV/AIDS resurgence are too heavy to ignore. 
 
 
Promote workers’ rights in other parts of the world 
 In the short term, Cambodia's economic performance is very likely to remain tied 
to sustained demand and growth from the garment sector, which accounts for roughly 
90% of all exports (Beresford et al., 2004; Grumiau, 2004). To this point, Cambodian 
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 The estimated cost for HIV/AIDS treatment in Cambodia to cover all infected individuals would be as 
much is 7% of GNP (Bith, 2004). 
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factories have largely been able to minimize the effects of overseas competition. This is 
credited, in large part, to the preference of manufacturers to support higher labor 
standards within the kingdom and avoid association with "sweat shop" factories, but most 
observers feel that a relatively low-cost supply of labor is crucial to maintaining 
Cambodia's strong presence in the garment industry (Bargawi, 2005; Chan et al., 2006; 
Sullivan, 2009). 
 With higher skilled and potentially lower cost competitors emerging in places like 
China, India, Cambodia's Garment Manufacturing groups should continue to publicly 
press issues of workers‟ rights. This runs contrary to the notion that they can increase 
demand by further lowering labor costs, but could create a situation in which they remain 
a preferred producer because workers' rights are lower in other areas. Public awareness 
and concern are Cambodia's biggest competitive strength in garments, and it may serve 
them to highlight conditions in other nations rather than decrease labor standards in their 
own. 
 By examining current pathways between migration, garment work, and 
prostitution, it is reasonable to assume that a short-term contraction in Cambodia's 
garment industry could lead to an increase in formal and informal sex work (Nishigaya, 
2002; Webber et al., 2010). Therefore, sustaining this sector could be important in the 
fight against HIV/AIDS, but only if it can be accomplished in a way that doesn't further 
marginalize women and encourage high-risk behavior.  
Continue and expand current micro-medical measures 
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 Clearly, the micro-medical campaigns that are in place have been a crucial factor 
in containing HIV/AIDS in Cambodia over the last decade. However, as they could be 
considered the "last line of defense" in a high-risk SDH situation, it is imperative that 
they begin to reach further than traditional risk groups and into other parts of the 
population. 
 Although direct sex workers may be easier to identify and target, current 
estimates suggest that indirect sex workers account for 60% of all prostitution in 
Cambodia (Sopheab et al., 2008). Outside of those groups, preventative measures are 
even lower. Condoms are simply not considered in most marriages and even semi-
exclusive relationships. A study of 102 female garment workers showed that 87% never 
used a condom with their partners. The most cited reasons were that use of a condom 
would indicate a "lack of trust," and a fear that the request could bring about an end to the 
relationship (Webber et al., 2010). 
 Given that nearly half of all new infections are among married women, it's clear 
that the virus has the potential to move beyond the "at risk" communities that currently 
receive the most attention. It's important that education and micro-medical preventative 
measures are conducted more extensively with all parts of the Cambodian population, if 
micro-medical interventions are to continue to play such an important role in Cambodia's 
fight against HIV/AIDS. 
Two Final Thoughts on Policy Change 
 Two brief notes should be added to the policy recommendations in this study. The 
first is that several of these recommendations obviously sit in stark contrast to the 
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prevailing economic changes that are sweeping through Cambodia. Indeed, they tend to 
target income and wealth redistribution, directly or indirectly, which is not a direction 
likely to be chosen by many of the predominant development organizations operating in 
the kingdom, like the World Bank or IMF. 
 But while they might not be consistent with neoliberal economic theory, they are 
fairly consistent with its practice in the real world. Industrialized nations, such as those in 
North America and Western Europe, rely on a system of complex tariffs and treaties to 
protect domestic interests. Few would claim that any of these countries are against 
globalization, but the implicit moral of the story is clear: We love free trade but are 
willing to make laws to keep its most insidious effects at bay. A number of critiques have 
pointed out that proponents of neoliberal policies often overestimate their positive effects 
and under-account for the transitions and interim stages that developing countries go 
through (Bretton Woods Project, 2005). 
 In the case of Cambodia, such realizations could have important health 
implications. While diseases certainly affect an individual's circumstances, they also 
bring heavy costs to the rest of society, through lost productivity, exposure to illness, etc. 
(Wilkinson, 1996; Kim et al., 2000). Who is the real "user" when a person contracts an 
STI and carries the potential to infect others with a deadly disease? Changing the way 
policymakers think about health, and especially HIV/AIDS, and the country may require 
a perspective that's different from those provided by the neoliberal framework but is 
ultimately more effective in halting spread of the disease. 
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The second point to be made is that it is highly unlikely that the official 
policymakers in Cambodia would be able to enact these changes on their own. On a 
surface level, pervasive corruption, combined with low skill and information levels, make 
it difficult for the Cambodian government to enact lasting reforms in any area (Beresford 
et al., 2004). Of larger consequence, however, is that they are in many ways beholden to 
donors and advisors who yield tremendous amounts of influence in the country, a 
situation that is not uncommon in the developing world (Barnett, 2002). 
As an example, the imposition of a tariff on an American product, for example, 
within Cambodia would have very small effect on any major American producer (like a 
pharmaceutical firm, for instance.) But if the situation were reversed, and a Cambodian 
producer were to find new barriers or fees to ship goods to North America, the effect 
would be enormous and devastating, since that income might be crucial to the firm – not 
to mention each of its employees and even the Cambodian government. Thus 
stakeholders have few bargaining chips left to use if they want to leverage policies back 
in their favor. Liberalization, by its very nature, disembowels small governments relative 
to the owners of financial capital (Barnett, 2002; Birdsall, 2006). Because investments 
can be withdrawn or relocated with few barriers, the implicit danger is always that 
development, wages, and other lifelines will be withdrawn if the "wrong" policies are 
pursued. 
 For that reason, much of Cambodia‟s future reform, and any serious efforts to 
stem off another pandemic of HIV/AIDS, will likely need to originate in, or at a 
minimum be supported by, the various foreign stakeholders operating in the country. As 
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much as health is a stated priority of many Western relief agencies and international 
groups, it remains overshadowed by their actions. For the social determinants of 
HIV/AIDS in Cambodia to improve substantially, more attention and commitment will 
have to be offered from the rest of the world's more powerful players. 
As important as condoms and clean needles are to the fight against HIV/AIDS, 
it‟s becoming increasingly important that planners and advisors see Cambodia's 
pandemic as an issue that has social and economic as well as health components. The 
purpose and intention of this study is not to predict a resurgence of HIV/AIDS in 
Cambodia, but to point out that the underlying susceptibility and vulnerability risks that 
preceded the first, rapid wave of HIV cases have not gone away, and indeed may actually 
be worsened for some populations. The micro-medical measures in place to fight 
HIV/AIDS in Cambodia are necessary, but they might be even more effective if they 
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